



The History of the Muslim Brotherhood

A Report by
9 Bedford Row
2 April 2015

9 Bedford Row
London WC1R 4AZ
0044 207 489 2727
www.9bri.com



Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	4
1.1 SUBJECT MATTER OF REPORT	5
1.2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE REPORTS.....	6
1.3 CURRENT REPORT: METHODOLOGY	7
CHAPTER 2: GROWTH STRATEGY & OBJECTIVES	8
2.1 THE GROWTH STRATEGY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT.....	9
2.1.1 <i>Setting the foundations for a mass movement</i>	9
2.2 ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES.....	12
2.2.1 <i>Islam is the Solution</i>	12
2.2.2 <i>Totalitarian reform</i>	14
2.2.3 <i>Using the language of violence</i>	16
2.2.4 <i>Creation of an Anti-systemic movement</i>	17
2.2.5 <i>Personal morality</i> 21	
2.2.6 <i>Control: Adoption of the 'General Law' of the Muslim Brotherhood</i>	22
2.2.7 <i>Culture of allegiance and obedience</i>	24
2.3 UNITY	26
2.3.1 <i>Breadth of the Organisation</i>	26
2.3.2 <i>Social reform programme</i>	32
2.4 WORKING THE SYSTEM	35
2.5 ACTS OF VIOLENCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS	38
CHAPTER 3: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE.....	48
3.1 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT	49
3.1.1 <i>Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as an Islamic movement in Egypt</i>	49
3.1.2 <i>Emergence of a functional framework for growth</i>	49
3.1.3 <i>Development of a concrete organisational structure</i>	51
3.2 JIHAD AND THE PARAMILITARY BRANCH OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (THE "SECRET APPARATUS")	55
3.3 KEY FIGURES OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD	63
3.3.1 <i>Past leaders who significantly influenced the culture and direction of the Muslim Brotherhood</i>	63
3.3.2 <i>Leaders of Secret Apparatus and their position of influence in the Muslim Brotherhood</i>	65
3.3.3 <i>Most prominent theologians and ideologists encouraged violent jihad</i>	66
3.3.4 <i>Current leadership</i>	67
3.4 THE INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD	73
3.4.1 <i>The international Muslim Brotherhood network and its relationship with Egypt</i>	73
3.4.2 <i>The Muslim Brotherhood in Arab countries</i>	77
3.4.3 <i>The Muslim Brotherhood in European countries</i>	78
3.4.4 <i>Global ideology and political integration</i>	79



3.4.5	<i>Political tactics</i>	80
3.5	CONCLUDING REMARKS	81
CHAPTER 4: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD & MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS ..		82
4.1	INTRODUCTION	83
4.2	MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE ORIGINS OF MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS.....	83
4.2.1	<i>Origins of al- Qa'ida</i>	84
4.2.2	<i>Origins of the Islamic State, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab</i>	92
4.2.4	<i>Sinai Province, formerly Ansar Beit al-Maqdis</i>	96
4.3	SHARED IDEOLOGY AND VALUES	98
4.3.1	<i>The Muslim Brotherhood</i>	98
4.3.2	<i>Al-Qassam Brigades</i>	106
4.3.3	<i>Al-Qa'ida</i>	107
4.3.4	<i>Islamic State</i>	113
4.3.5	<i>Sinai Province, formerly Ansar Beit al-Maqdis</i>	115
4.3.6	<i>Boko Haram</i>	117
4.3.7	<i>Al-Shabaab</i>	120
4.4	MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD SUPPORT FOR MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS.....	122
4.4.1	<i>Political support</i>	123
4.4.2	<i>Material support</i>	130
4.5	REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD	136
4.6	CONCLUDING REMARKS	137
CHAPTER 5: REVIEW OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN EGYPT 1970-2010.....		140
5.1	1970s-80s: REGROUPING AND REBUILDING	141
5.2	1990s – 2011: EMERGENCE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AS A POLITICAL FORCE IN EGYPT	143
5.2.1	<i>Success in 1980s elections</i>	143
5.2.2	<i>Social impact</i>	143
5.3	MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD BECOMES MAIN POLITICAL OPPOSITION GROUP IN EGYPT	145
CHAPTER 6: CURRENT STATUS OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT.....		147
6.1	PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO MORSI GOVERNMENT	148
GLOSSARY		151



CHAPTER 1

Introduction



1.1 Subject Matter of Report

1. This report by members of the international practice group at 9 Bedford Row Chambers, of London has been commissioned by the State Lawsuit (Litigation) Authority of Egypt to provide an overview of the history of the Muslim Brotherhood looking at its structure, organisation and activities.
2. In the report we review the Muslim Brotherhood's objectives and growth strategy since its inception in 1928, up to the present day. There is analysis of the underlying tenets of the Muslim Brotherhood and its support and the methods employed to achieve its political goals.
3. We have also looked at the organisational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood – a structure that has been substantially unchanged since its formation in the early 1930s. This has caused us to focus upon the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood's paramilitary branch, the 'Secret Apparatus', and the central role it has held within the movement throughout its history. The key figures in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood are discussed, as is the formation and structure of the 'international' Muslim Brotherhood network.
4. There is also analysis of the underlying ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood from which various militant Islamists groups have originated. Specifically in Chapter 4 we examine the origins of groups



such as Al-Qa'ida, Islamic State, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qassam Brigades and Sinai Province and their association with the Muslim Brotherhood. This review also includes the Muslim Brotherhood's continued material support for these groups.

5. The report in Chapter 5 goes on to examine the Muslim Brotherhood as a political force in Egypt and how in the 1980s it became the main opposition party. The group's political trajectory and the consequent social effects of its rise in prominence are also discussed.
6. There is a brief introduction in the concluding Chapter 6 to the current status of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt following the revolution against President Morsi's government in 2013. The topics discussed in this Chapter and other related topics are to be analysed in greater detail in a series of subsequent reports that have been commissioned by the State Lawsuit (Litigation) Authority, namely: The Egyptian experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in power 2012-2013; The Egyptian Revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood 2013; and The current situation in Egypt. All these are due for completion within 2015.

1.2 Purpose and Objective of the Reports

7. The reports will, together, present a comprehensive and effective review of the Muslim Brotherhood so that independent assessments may be made as to the nature of the organisation and its allied groups



and organisations. We have not produced a document that has been tied to a chronology of development of the Muslim Brotherhood, but we have approached the project by looking at the issues and used a comparative approach.

8. The reports will be evidence-based documents that also provide the necessary historical, social and political context in order to accurately demonstrate the true nature of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organisation. They will also review the impact of the brief period in which it was in power in Egypt and during which it managed to cause significant social, economic and political (as well as national reputational) damage.

1.3 Current Report: Methodology

9. This report was wholly produced using open-source materials, drawing heavily on academic literature of the history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as news reports of significant events in which it was involved. Where reference is made to sources freely available on-line, hyperlinks have been inserted for ease of reference.
10. A glossary of transliterated Arabic terms can be found at the end of this report. Where possible, English translations of Arabic terms are used. Where direct translation may not be possible or might be difficult the original Arabic term is used with a translation included in the glossary.



CHAPTER 2

Growth Strategy & Objectives



2.1 The Growth Strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

2.1.1 *Setting the foundations for a mass movement*

11. The growth strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from 1928 to the 1980s demonstrates that the group sought to implement and achieve their founding aims, of an Islam formulated from and based on revelations in the Qur'an and the wisdom of the Prophet in the *Sunna*, that is applicable to all times and to all places and is a total system complete unto itself,¹ with a high degree of pragmatism.

12. According to al-Banna:

"It is the nature of Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations and to extend its power to the entire planet."²

13. The ultimate goal of a universal Islamic state could not be achieved overnight. The strategy has had to shift and react to the changing political landscape.

14. The impact of the strategy can be seen by the Muslim Brotherhood's exponential growth from 800 members in 1936, to over 2 million in

¹ Al-Banna, in Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 14.

² Hoveyda, F., "The Broken Crescent: The Threat of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism", Praeger Publishers (2002), page 56.



1948. It currently is a pervasive international Sunni Islamist movement, with branches or affiliated groups in over 70 countries. The Muslim Brotherhood also maintains political parties in many Middle Eastern and African countries, including Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Israel.

15. As noted in [article II of the Charter of Hamas](#):

“The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine. Moslem Brotherhood Movement is a universal organisation which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times. It is characterized by... its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts...the spreading of Islam... and conversion to Islam.” (*emphasis added*).³

16. A further indicator of the effectiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood’s growth strategy is that the Muslim Brotherhood has provided the ideological model for a number of modern Sunni Islamic terrorist groups, and the leaders of such groups, including Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed have been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

17. The international spread and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is considered in detail in Chapter 4 below.

³ [The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement \[Hamas\], 18 August 1988, Article II](#)



18. The Muslim Brotherhood's pragmatic growth strategy is also evident through:

(a) the ideological rhetoric that has developed, shifted and been re-interpreted over the years to match the shifting political landscape, although the underlying aims remain the same;

(b) the idea of 'unity' that included:

(i) the desire to grow as broad an organisation as possible, achieved in part through the toleration, accommodation and, at times the encouragement of militant and extremist reactionary elements, and

(ii) the development of a social-reform programme that was regarded as a natural method for establishing both the philosophy and authoritarian control;

(c) working the system, despite an anti-system rhetoric, to further its aims and influence; and

(d) acts of violence for political ends.



19. The following sections: (i) Original objectives; (ii) Unity; (iii) Working the System and (iv) Acts of Violence for Political Ends, demonstrate that the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and growth strategy from 1928 to the 1980s spoke the language of violence, rejected the traditions and values of the *status quo*, and accepted violence as a means to achieving its ends.

2.2 Original objectives

20. The all-encompassing, broadly sketched goals of the Muslim Brotherhood, expressed through the slogan, '[Islam is the Solution](#)',⁴ have not changed since its inception in 1928. Its principles, encompassed by its motto, "Allah is our objective, the Qur'an is our constitution, the Prophet is our leader, *jihad* is our path and death in the name of Allah is our goal," have been stated both by Hasan al-Banna, the movement's founder, and by Mohammed Morsi in his 13th May 2012 Presidential campaign speech.

2.2.1 *Islam is the Solution*

21. Hassan al-Banna's founding principles of the Muslim Brotherhood insisted upon:

- i. an Islam as a total system complete unto itself;

⁴ [BBC News, "Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood", 25 December 2013.](#)



- ii. an Islam formulated from and based on its two primary sources, the revelation in the Qur'an and the wisdom of the Prophet in the *Sunna*; and
 - iii. an Islam applicable to all times and to all places.⁵
22. The founding principles were drawn primarily from reformist Islamist thinkers of the nineteenth century such as Rashid Rida and Jamal al-Din Afghani, who believed that the only way the Islamic world could meet the challenges posed by Westernisation and modernization was to return to the 'uncorrupted' values of the Islamic past.⁶
23. Al-Banna's vision for the purpose of the Muslim Brotherhood is clear in his farewell message, *'The Obstacles in Our Path'*, written to his followers in 1943 when al-Banna believed he was about to be exiled by the British:

"My Brothers: you are not a benevolent society, nor are you a political party, nor a local organisation having limited purposes. Rather you are a new soul in the heart of this nation to give it life by the means of the Qur'an; you are a new light which

⁵ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., *"The Society of the Muslim Brothers"*, Oxford University Press (1993), page 14.

⁶ Pargeter, A., *"The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power"*, Saqi Books (2013), page 9, 20.



shines to destroy the darkness of materialism through knowing God..."⁷

24. Al-Banna recognized that his vision may require the use of violence as a means to achieve the end when he continued, in *'The Obstacles in Our Path'*:

"If you are accused of being revolutionaries, say 'We are voices for right and peace in which we dearly believe, and of which we are proud. If you rise against us or stand in the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves against your injustice.'"⁸

25. Indeed, militancy and martyrdom were considered to be central virtues in the Muslim Brotherhood's ethos.⁹

2.2.2 *Totalitarian reform*

26. Al-Banna believed in a comprehensive, all-encompassing, totalitarian doctrine of reform:

"The idea of the Muslim Brothers includes in it all categories of reform."¹⁰

⁷ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., *"The Society of the Muslim Brothers"*, Oxford University Press (1993), page 29 – 30.

⁸ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., *"The Society of the Muslim Brothers"*, Oxford University Press (1993), page 29 – 30.

⁹ Mitchell, R., *"The Society of the Muslim Brothers"*, Oxford University Press (1993), page 206.



“The Muslim Brothers believe that when Allah most High revealed the Qur’an and ordered his worshippers to follow Muhammad, He placed in this true religion all the necessary foundations for the renaissance and happiness of nations...”¹¹

“Islam established for the world the system through which man can benefit from the good and avoid dangers and calamities.”¹²

27. Seeking to impose a total system complete unto itself, al-Banna defined the movement as:

“a Salafiyya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organisation, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea.”¹³

28. Al-Banna stated:

“We believe the provisions of Islam and its teachings are all inclusive, encompassing the affairs of the people in this world and hereafter...because Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation (*watan*) and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed,

¹⁰ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 14.

¹¹ Al-Banna, H., “Majmu ‘at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid al-Banna” [The Collected Letters of the Martyred Imam al-Banna], Dar al-Qur’an al-Karim (1981), page 46 – 7.

¹² Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 233.

¹³ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 14.



holy text and sword.... The Glorious Qur'an ...considers [these things] to be the core of Islam and its essence...."¹⁴

29. The totality of the system was reiterated by Umar al-Tilmisani, the Third General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. Islam [he said](#), is:

"a creed, worship, homeland, citizenship, creation, the physical culture, law, forgiveness, and power."¹⁵

2.2.3 *Using the language of violence*

30. The Muslim Brotherhood espoused a reactionary, aggressive and violent rhetoric at its outset. The six members of the British camp labour force allegedly spoke of "the road to action" and of dying in the service of God, when they asked al-Banna to launch the Muslim Brotherhood, and they are all said to have taken an oath to God to be "troops [*jund*] for the message of Islam".¹⁶

31. At the Fifth Muslim Brotherhood Conference in 1939, al-Banna warned that "action, not speech, and preparations not slogans, would guarantee the victory."¹⁷ Al-Banna stated:

¹⁴ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 233.

¹⁵ Tilmisani, U., "Do the Missionaries for God Have a Program?", in Abed-Kotob, S., ["The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt"](#), 27(3) [International Journal of Middle East Studies](#) (1995), page 323.

¹⁶ Pargeter, A., "The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power", Saqi Books (2013), page 8.

¹⁷ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 15.



“At the time that there will be ready, Oh ye Muslim Brothers, three hundred battalions, each one equipped spiritually with faith and belief, intellectually with science and learning, and physically with training and athletics, at that time you can demand of me to plunge with you through the turbulent oceans and to rend the skies with you and to conquer with you every tyrant. God willing, I will do it.”¹⁸

32. In line with this vision of the stage of execution and the requirement of force, al-Banna specifically included militancy as part of the training of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is discussed in detail in the section on the Rover Scouts and Secret Apparatus in Chapter 3 of this report.

2.2.4 Creation of an Anti-systemic movement

33. The Muslim Brotherhood’s founding purpose was anti-Western, anti-Imperialist and anti-colonial. Its message was one that rejected not only British rule, but also the traditions, values and methods of their rule. The Muslim Brotherhood believed the occupation, and subsequent decay of Islamic values, meant a “slow annihilation and

¹⁸ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 15.



profound and complete corruption”¹⁹ for Egypt. According to al-Banna:

“Western civilization has invaded us by force and with aggression on the level of science and money, of politics and luxury, of pleasures and negligence, and of various aspects of life that are comfortable, exciting and seductive.”²⁰

34. Al-Banna taught that “formal political independence” was worthless unless accompanied by “intellectual, social, and cultural independence.”²¹ He, and Hudaybi after him, called for members of the Muslim Brotherhood to “eject Imperialism from your souls, and it will leave your lands.” Qutb in turn called for “Holy war” to be declared against Western civilization.

35. Al-Banna rejected the imitation of Western thoughts and values:

“We want to think independently, depending on ... Islam and not upon imitation which ties us to the theories and attitudes of the West in everything. We want to be distinguished by our

¹⁹ Muslim Brotherhood Newspaper, 24 October 1946, in Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 227.

²⁰ Ramadan, T., “Aux Sources du Renouveau Musulman, D’Al-Afhani à Hassan al-Banna, un siècle de réformisme islamique”, Tawhid (2002), page 362, in Pargeter, A., “The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power”, Saqi Books (2013), page 21.

²¹ Muslim Brotherhood Newspaper, 9 July 1946, in Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 230.



own values and the qualities of our life as a great ... nation which has a past"²²

36. In the Muslim Brotherhood's view, western democratic government had not only failed, but had made the people victim to a corrupt and abusive political-economic social 'tyranny'.²³

37. Given its rejection of the party system, the Muslim Brotherhood's pragmatism is evident in its willingness to put candidates forward for election. It is also evident in its ability to work with political parties in order to achieve some of its objectives, and in modern times even to embrace the party system.

38. The discourse rejected the economic order, which it considered to be dominated by 'the foreigners' who viewed Egyptians with little esteem.²⁴ From the outset, the language of the movement was rife with anger towards the humiliation and lack of Arab and Muslim status, known as *manzila*, and dignity, known as *karama*.²⁵ The Muslim Brotherhood spoke of purging the nation of its "painful economic oppressions" as a defence to both capitalism and communism.²⁶

²² Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 242.

²³ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 219.

²⁴ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 222.

²⁵ Pargeter, A., "The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power", Saqi Books (2013), page 8.

²⁶ Ghazali in Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 229.



39. As the foreigner, described as *khawaja*, was invariably a Christian or Jew, the Muslim Brotherhood's rhetoric that it stood "in defence of Islam" meant that the foreigner was regarded as a religious and cultural, as well as a political and economic, enemy.²⁷

40. The Jews also became a metaphor for Western domination and immorality, and the threat to the integrity of Islam. The highly influential ideologue, Sayyid Qutb's essay, "*Our struggle with the Jews*", described the Jews as Islam's worst enemies, the continuing battle raging for 1400 years. The essay vilified the Jews, stating that they:

"destroy the moral foundation on which the pure Creed rests, in order that the Creed should fall into the filth which they spread so widely on the earth. They mutilate the whole of history and falsify it [...] From such creatures who kill, massacre and defame prophets one can only expect the spilling of human blood and dirty means which would further their machinations and evil."²⁸

41. According to al-Banna, "[i]t was natural that there should be a clash between the [Muslim Brotherhood and missionaries] in view of the fact that one of them defends Islam and the second attacks it."²⁹

²⁷ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 222.

²⁸ Qutb, S., "Ma'rakatuna ma'a al-Yuhad" [Our Struggle with the Jews], (1950).

²⁹ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 231.



42. Concerns regarding Christian missionaries were the focus of the First General Conference of the Muslim Brotherhood in May 1933, and a letter was sent to King Fu'ad urging these activities to be brought under control.³⁰ During the 1930s and 1940s the Muslim Brotherhood lobbied ministers and members of parliament for Islam to be taught in schools, labelled missionary schools as 'corrupt' and called for them to be closed.³¹

43. Inevitably, the local Christian or Jew was also identified with the foreign enemy.³² In 1948, during the war in Palestine, houses in part of the Jewish quarter in Cairo were attacked and destroyed, Jewish owned businesses were destroyed or damaged by explosions and anti-foreign rioting occurred.³³

2.2.5 *Personal morality*

44. Al-Banna's goal of an all encompassing application of Islam was to be built upon the reform of individual hearts and souls, followed by the organisation of "[society to be fit for the virtuous community which](#)

³⁰ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 13.

³¹ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 285.

³² Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), 222.

³³ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 63 – 4.



commands the good and forbids evil-doing, then from the community will arise the good (i.e. Islamic) state.”³⁴

45. The set of personal rights for all individuals encompassed by Islam were designed to, “raise the standards of individuals, permit their participation in activities which would serve the welfare of society, safeguard human dignity, nurture individual talents, and aid in the exploitation of their physical and intellectual resources.”³⁵ Whilst speaking the language of ‘rights’, therefore, a high degree of control can be justified.

2.2.6 Control: Adoption of the ‘General Law’ of the Muslim Brotherhood

46. One of the most important developments that took place during the early-to-mid 1930s was the adoption by the Muslim Brotherhood of the General Law at the Third Conference in 1935. This laid the initial foundations for the organisational administration and control of the Muslim Brotherhood and codified the rules for: (i) policy and decision-making; (ii) membership status and responsibilities; (iii) funding; and (iv) recruitment.

47. The General Law stipulated that the fundamental aim of the Muslim Brotherhood was “to raise a generation of Muslims who would

³⁴ Al-Banna in Abed-Kotob, S., [“The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt”, 27\(3\) International Journal of Middle East Studies \(1995\),](#) page 323.

³⁵ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., *“The Society of the Muslim Brothers”*, Oxford University Press (1993), 249.



understand Islam correctly and act according to its teachings”.³⁶ The training prescribed by al-Banna was set out in detailed instructions and distributed to all organs and branches of the Muslim Brotherhood with the aim to “...produce a class of propagandists...who could spread the [Muslim Brotherhood]’s ideas, thereby expanding the organisation.”³⁷ Al-Banna viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as predominantly a vehicle to spread and recruit adherents to his vision of Islam. This was reflected in Article 8 of the General Law which listed, amongst other rules and obligations, the religious duties to be fulfilled by members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Article 8 states that the fulfilment of this and other duties was to be:

“[...] the measure of the member’s faith in the [Muslim Brotherhood]’s idea. It measures his observance, his devotion and zealotry for the ideology of the [Muslim Brotherhood].

[...]”³⁸

48. A revised version of the regulations was adopted by the *Shura* Council in 1948 and with the appointment of Hasan al-Hudaybi as the new General Guide, an additional series of “General Internal Regulations” were also adopted.³⁹ Together, these rules (which would continue to be revised and updated) would constitute the primary sources

³⁶ Lia, B., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942”, Ithaca Press, (2010), page 102-103.

³⁷ Lia, B., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942”, Ithaca Press, (2010), page 102-103.

³⁸ General Rules of the Muslim Brotherhood (1934), Article 8.

³⁹ After the assassination of al-Banna, Hasan al-Hudaybi succeeded him to the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood.



establishing the Muslim Brotherhood's organisational structure and informing its administrative and technical operations.⁴⁰

2.2.7 *Culture of allegiance and obedience*

49. Since its inception, one of the hallmarks of the Muslim Brotherhood has been the cultivation of a culture of obedience among its members toward its leadership, in particular the General Guide. Its laws and regulations cemented the General Guide's overall authority of and control over the Muslim Brotherhood and all its bodies, associate (or affiliated) branches and members. Such was the importance placed on the duty of obedience that all members, irrespective of societal position or membership status, are still required to swear an oath of allegiance, or *bay'a*, to the General Guide and the leader of their section, committee or local branch. In turn there are consequences for disobedience which might take the form of a fine, demotion, suspension or, in serious cases, expulsion from the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴¹

50. Al-Banna had put in place a system to ensure that the allegiance and obedience of recruits was not arbitrary. He structured the recruitment process to synchronise with his long-term strategy for indoctrinating new recruits to carry out the leadership's orders without hesitation or

⁴⁰ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 161.

⁴¹ Al-Banna in Lia, B., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942", Ithaca Press, (2010), page 105. See also, Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 183-184.



question. Regular ‘training’ or ‘educational’ meetings referred to as “Battalion Assemblies” were held strictly in confidence to entrench this culture across all ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood.

51. Beyond the developments in the organisational structure and hierarchy (discussed in Chapter 3), Al-Banna put his vision into practice, ensuring that the movement was organised so that members of the Muslim Brotherhood were engaged in programmes of ‘good works’ at the same time as encouraging and monitoring each other as regards the precepts of personal morality laid down in Islamic Law, known as *sharia*. This was important as a method of organisation and control, fulfilled the right to education, which was regarded as a ‘religious obligation’ and ‘the path to God’ and was a response to the problem of Western influences.⁴²

52. Western influences were accused of destroying the inherited and traditional values of Muslim society. The cinema, stage, radio and popular music, the uncontrolled press and permissibility of wine, the indiscriminate mixing of the sexes and the immodest behaviour of women were blamed for corrupting society and breeding immorality.

⁴² Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 249.



53. Al-Banna demanded controls over all media of communication, so that theatres, films, songs, radio, press and magazines could be used to promote nobility and virtue.⁴³
54. Al-Banna further sought to control personal morality, calling for strict surveillance over coffee houses and summer resorts. He called for heavier punishment for crimes against morality as well as the abolition of prostitution, and the prosecution of adultery.
55. There were sporadic but continuous acts of intolerant violence and interference by some members in the name of Islam and its morality, inspired by al-Banna's militant sense of righteous power.⁴⁴ At one point, a group led by Ahmed Rifat proposed that all members of the Muslim Brotherhood should, "carry bottles of ink to throw at those women who did not wear correct Islamic attire."⁴⁵

2.3 Unity

2.3.1 *Breadth of the Organisation*

56. The idea of 'unity' underlines the growth strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood between 1928 and the 1980s, through both the breadth of

⁴³ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 292.

⁴⁴ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 293.

⁴⁵ Abdelhalim in Pargeter, A., "The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power", Saqi Books (2013), page 25.



the organisation and through its all-encompassing social-reform programme.

57. Al-Banna explained his vision for membership of the Muslim Brotherhood. He stated:

“I did not want it to enter into competition with the other orders; and I did not want it to be confined to one group of Muslims or one aspect of Islamic reform; rather I sought that it be a general message based on learning, education and *jihad*”⁴⁶

58. Al-Banna sought to grow the membership of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to encourage unity and inclusivity. He is said to have pleaded:

“Let us co-operate in those things on which we can agree and be lenient in those which we cannot.”⁴⁷

59. This strategy, to grow as broad an organisation as possible, has been continued throughout the Muslim Brotherhood’s history and has been achieved in part through pragmatic mergers, suppression of dissent, and through the toleration, accommodation and, at times the encouragement of militant and extremist reactionary elements.

⁴⁶ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 215.

⁴⁷ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 217.



60. The first example of a pragmatic merger occurred in 1932 when the Muslim Brotherhood merged with Cairo's 'The Society for Islamic Culture'. This merger assisted the Muslim Brotherhood form firm foundations in the city, providing both a contact book and an operational starting point.
61. The Muslim Brotherhood's first significant dispute occurred in 1932. Dissidents, who complained of the dangerousness of the Muslim Brotherhood and its 'secret works' and above all its denial of 'freedom of opinion', were beaten by al-Banna's supporters.⁴⁸ This demonstrates that the breadth of the organisation and its inclusivity inevitably led to internal disputes and conflict, some of which could be and were suppressed or contained.
62. From 1932 to 1938, there was increasing resistance and discontent within the movement. Some members resented the use of some of the funds raised to support the Arab strike in Palestine to fund the branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Al-Banna attracted intense criticism for his willingness to cooperate with authorities, despite the anti-system and reactionary rhetoric. Some members felt the moral salvation of Egypt, through Islamification, should be achieved by force.⁴⁹

Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 11.

⁴⁹ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 19; Pargeter, A., "The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power", Saqi Books (2013), page 25 – 26.



63. Al-Banna sought to accommodate the more militant elements led by Ahmed Rifat, believing that containment was the most appropriate solution for the militant currents that had evolved in the movement.⁵⁰ Although he continued to deal with the powers of the day, he also adopted a more aggressive rhetoric. For example, in May 1938 al-Banna declared that if the authorities failed to implement the Muslim Brotherhood's programmes the movement would consider itself:

“at war with every leader, every party and every organisation that does not work for the victory of Islam!”⁵¹

64. Al-Banna accommodated the more militant activists within the Muslim Brotherhood when he set up the Secret Apparatus, known as the *Nizam al-Khass*, in or around 1940,⁵² in line with his conception of *jihad*. However, al-Banna, struggled to contain his creation.⁵³ [By the late 1940s the Secret Apparatus, under Abdel Rahman al-Sanadi, was responsible for a series of acts of political violence, and had established a high level of executive autonomy](#)⁵⁴. The Secret Apparatus, and its

⁵⁰ Pargeter, A., “The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power”, Saqi Books (2013), page 26.

⁵¹ Lia, B., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942”, Ithaca Press, (2010), page 251. See also Pargeter, A., “The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power”, Saqi Books (2013), page 26

⁵² Lia, B., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942”, Ithaca Press, (2010), page 178.

⁵³ Pargeter, A., “The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power”, Saqi Books (2013), page 28.

⁵⁴ [Zollner, B., “Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Persecution, 1954 to 1971”, 39\(3\) International Journal of Middle East Studies \(2007\), page 414.](#)



significance throughout the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, is considered in more depth in Chapter 3.

65. Although al-Banna's successor as General Guide, Hasan al-Hudaybi, publicly condemned the Secret Apparatus's acts of violence, he was pressured by senior members of the leadership (many of whom were either members of or supported the Secret Apparatus) into retracting his statements. The militant activists had formed a powerful hub within the leadership echelons of the Muslim Brotherhood, sufficient to control Hudaybi from behind the scenes as they perceived him to be a 'weak' leader.

66. The dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood by Nasser in January 1954, and the imprisonment of a large number of members of the Muslim Brotherhood following the attempt on Nasser's life in October 1954 caused the near collapse of the movement. [However, by 1957 to 1958, prisoners began to discuss and exchange ideas, a communication network was built up linking prisoners, and Organisation 1965 was set up, with Sayyid Qutb, as its spiritual guide.](#)⁵⁵

67. [Organisation 1965 subscribed to Qutb's idea](#) that they, as the vanguard of Islamist activism, had to pass through several challenging stages of study, preaching, and persecution to reach their goal of establishing a

⁵⁵ [Zollner, B., "Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution, 1954 to 1971", 39\(3\) International Journal of Middle East Studies \(2007\), page 418.](#)



just Islamic society.⁵⁶ Because Qutb's ideological development was not a secret, [it can be concluded that al-Hudaybi was aware of the ideological foundations of Organisation 1965](#) and that he chose to tacitly accept, if not support, their activities.⁵⁷

68. In 1965, when Organisation 1965 was brought to court and accused of planning to overthrow the state system, the regime carried out a second wave of arrests and trials. Al-Hudaybi distanced himself from the group, his criticisms of radical activism later contained in *Du'at la Qudat*, translated as "Preachers not Judges". The 1967 Arab-Israeli war caused further division within the Muslim Brotherhood and a number of Qutb's followers including Mustafa Shukri broke away to establish the militant Takfir wal Hijra group.⁵⁸

69. In the 1970s, Sadat released a number of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and allowed the return of former leaders of the Secret Apparatus to Egypt. These leaders set about rebuilding the organisation with a militant focus. This is discussed further in Chapter 3.

⁵⁶ [Zollner, B., "Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution, 1954 to 1971", 39\(3\) International Journal of Middle East Studies \(2007\), page 418.](#)

⁵⁷ [Zollner, B., "Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution, 1954 to 1971", 39\(3\) International Journal of Middle East Studies \(2007\), page 419.](#)

⁵⁸ Pargeter, A., "The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power", Saqi Books (2013), page 35.



2.3.2 *Social reform programme*

70. Al-Banna believed that organisations must pass through three phases of development or organisational perfection: (i) propaganda, communication and information; (ii) formation, selection and preparation; and (iii) execution.

71. The first stage applied to the generality of the membership. The second phase of development applied to those prepared to carry the burden of *jihad* and 'military action' without hesitation, question, doubt or criticism'. The third and final stage referred to a time of *jihad* and complete, unqualified acceptance and obedience of any order assigned.⁵⁹

72. Al-Banna's Islamic nation or *caliphate* was to be built upon the reform of individual hearts and souls, followed by the organisation of society to be fit for the virtuous community which commands the good and forbids evil-doing, then from the community will arise the good state. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were required to make a commitment to the movement described as, "action, obedience, and silence".⁶⁰ The development of a social-reform programme was regarded as a natural method for establishing both the philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood and authoritarian control of its members.

⁵⁹ Al-Banna Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 300 – 301.

⁶⁰ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 196.



73. In line with al-Banna's first phase of 'propaganda, communication, and information',⁶¹ the primary focus for the early years of the movement was to enlarge its membership, building a broad base of members that was tightly disciplined, organised and mobilized to generate further recruits through continual outreach and indoctrination.⁶² Al-Banna sought to do this through direct communication. He and his deputies spoke with people in mosques, homes, clubs and other meeting places. New branches were founded, followed by the creation of a wide array of social welfare projects such as establishing mosques, schools, clubs, small home industries, health clinics, bringing electricity to villages. These projects provided a focal point for the population,⁶³ and had the effect of developing a parallel state, through which the key ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood could be disseminated. Chapter 3 sets out what was to become a highly sophisticated organisational structure.

74. In its social-reform programme the Muslim Brotherhood placed great emphasis on education as a method by which to bring about its goals. Qutb stated:

"No renaissance of Islamic life can be effected purely by the law or statute, or by the establishment of a social system on the basis

⁶¹ Al-Banna in Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 13.

⁶² Euben, R. & Zaman, M. (Eds), "Princeton Readings in Islamic Thoughts: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden", Princeton UP (2009), page 51.

⁶³ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 9.



of the Islamic philosophy [...] [a]nd the natural method of establish[ing] that philosophy is by education.”⁶⁴

75. As the movement became more established, spiritual, mental and physical training, for “Islamic preparation” was organised by the public relations and propaganda unit of the organisation. The section was responsible for supplying branches with lecture programmes, for authorising publications of a ‘scientific, cultural, and athletic nature’ and for providing a unified schedule of study for missionary schools.⁶⁵

76. In 1937 the ‘Battalions of the Supporters of God’ were launched. The battalion system was consciously designed to generate total physical, mental, and spiritual absorption in and dedication to the Society, its ideas, and its members.⁶⁶ The later system of “families” organised the membership in a tight-knit chain of command, and was regarded as the active fulfilment of the meaning of Islam among the Brothers and the most fundamental of its educational’ instruments.⁶⁷

77. Al-Banna was so successful in establishing grassroots support through the social-reform programme that by the outbreak of the Second World War, the Muslim Brotherhood had “grown into one of the most

⁶⁴ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 284

⁶⁵ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 171 – 172 and 188.

⁶⁶ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 196.

⁶⁷ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 196.



important political contestants on the Egyptian scene”⁶⁸ with a diverse membership, including civil servants, students, urban labourers and peasants.

78. In 1929 there were 4 branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1931 there were 10 branches. By 1939 there were 300 branches, there were 500 branches by 1940 and 2000 branches by 1949. It is estimated that by 1949 there were 500,000 active members and around an additional 500,000 sympathisers.⁶⁹

2.4 Working the System

79. Despite an anti-system rhetoric, the Muslim Brotherhood has proved to be highly pragmatic in dealing with the authorities from 1928 to the 1980s, in order to further their objectives.

80. In the 1930s, al-Banna extensively communicated, by letter and in person, with the governments of Egypt about the state of Egyptian society, lobbying for reform.⁷⁰ In 1935, delegations from the Muslim Brotherhood visited the Minister of Education and the Prime Minister to push for the teaching of Islam and Islamic history in the schools of Egypt.⁷¹ In 1937, a key training and recruitment unit of the Muslim

⁶⁸ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 12.

⁶⁹ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 328.

⁷⁰ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 13.

⁷¹ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 284.



Brotherhood set up by al-Banna, the Rover Scouts (see Chapter 3), acted as security forces in the coronation of King Faruq,⁷² publicly demonstrating their strength and organisation.

81. In 1942, al-Banna sought to field seventeen candidates for the parliamentary elections. The government asked him to withdraw and to declare his loyalty to the government and the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the legal foundation for the British presence in Egypt. Despite the conflict of these requests with the Muslim Brotherhood's beliefs, al-Banna agreed on the condition that the movement was free to resume full-scale operations, and the government would take action against the sale of alcohol and prostitution. The government complied with his requests and permitted the Muslim Brotherhood to hold meetings and issue some of its publications.⁷³

82. In 1946 and 1947, the Muslim Brotherhood was rewarded for its stand against the Wafd and the Communists, receiving a licence to publish its official newspaper, *Jaridat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*, privileges in the purchase of newsprint, as well as other privileges. A Minister of Education sympathetic to Muslim Brotherhood views was also appointed.⁷⁴ However, this period is characterised by grassroots unrest: labour strikes, nationalist riots, battles between the youth of the

⁷² Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 16.

⁷³ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 27; and Pargeter, A., "The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power", Saqi Books (2013), page 24.

⁷⁴ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 42.



Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd, and political violence, which resulted in the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948.

83. In 1951, Hasan al-Hudaybi was appointed General Guide, in part because he was well connected to the establishment (the other reason was that he was perceived as a moderate public face but was elected because he was thought to be easy to manipulate by the inner core of militant leaders). During this period the Muslim Brotherhood supported the nationalist agitations culminating in Nasser's revolution; ending the British occupation coincided with their aims.

84. 1952 to 1954 was a period of conciliation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers. The regime released all the members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been imprisoned by the previous regime and opened an official inquiry into the murder of Hasan al-Banna. In 1953, despite the promulgation of the law banning political activities, the Muslim Brotherhood were allowed to continue its activities as an association with religious aims.⁷⁵ However, al-Hudaybi declined the opportunity for three members of the Muslim Brotherhood to join the cabinet, for fear of losing its popular quality.⁷⁶

85. In 1954 the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a political party and was dissolved. After the attempt on Nasser's life on 26 October 1954, for which the Muslim Brotherhood were deemed responsible, some

⁷⁵ Aly, A. & Wenner, M., "Modern Islamic Reform Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt", 36(3) Middle East Journal (1982), page 342.

⁷⁶ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 108.



members were sent to prison or sentenced to death, but others moved abroad, where they focused on building the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

86. In the 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood continued to work the system to its benefit. They were able to tactically ally with Sadat against the Left, which saw their release from prison, their active participation in the discussions preceding the promulgation of the Egyptian Constitution, and their student cadres to be active in the university campuses. Their success is demonstrated by their winning of nearly all the seats in the Student Union elections in every university in the country, as well as in the National Student Union.

2.5 Acts of Violence for Political Ends

87. There were two key political issues, the British Occupation and Palestine, which were the focus of acts of violence committed by members of the Muslim Brotherhood prior to, and immediately subsequent to their dissolution in 1948. Such was the level of violence that underlying the order dissolving the movement was the belief that the Muslim Brotherhood was planning imminent revolution.⁷⁷ The third political issue that of Nasser's nationalist rule, provided the focus of acts of violence committed by members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s.

⁷⁷ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 58. See also Levenberg, H., "Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945 – 1948", Frank Cass (1993), page 176



88. Prior to the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of 1946, al-Banna sent a letter to the King and to Sidqi pleading for an invitation to the nation to *jihad*, and an economic, cultural and social boycott of England. He called for major demonstrations all over the countryside and in the cities.⁷⁸

89. As a result, daily riots “exploded into orgies of fire – English books, stores, trams, and trees – and attacks on security and British forces in all the major centres.”⁷⁹ Continuous rioting, including attacks on British establishments and personnel and on the Egyptian police, led to the resignation of Sidqi Pasha and the appointment of Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha to form a Cabinet.

90. The Muslim Brotherhood had provided support to Palestine during the Arab general strike of 1936 and 1937, by raising money, sending supplies and equipment and by setting up a committee to propagandize the issue through the press, in pamphlets and in public speeches.⁸⁰ In 1947 missions were sent to inspire resistance to Zionism as well as to provide technical support and military training.

⁷⁸ Levenberg, H., “Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945 – 1948”, Frank Cass (1993), page 49.

⁷⁹ Levenberg, H., “Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945 – 1948”, Frank Cass (1993), page 50.

⁸⁰ Levenberg, H., “Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945 – 1948”, Frank Cass (1993), page 55.



91. By 1948 a number of members of the Muslim Brotherhood engaged the Zionists in Palestine until the movement was dissolved, after which the majority remained under the control of the army.
92. In October 1947 al-Banna ordered the branches of the Society to prepare for *jihad*. During December 1947 the Muslim Brotherhood carried out waves of anti-foreign demonstrations and riots in Cairo and Alexandria.⁸¹ In January 1948 the government announced that 165 bombs and cases of arms had been discovered, and had been confiscated by the police after a battle with some young Muslim Brothers who were training in the Muqattam hills near Cairo.⁸² The men claimed the arms were for Palestine, and were released immediately, suggesting their actions were condoned. In October 1948 the government discovered a cache of arms and munitions in Ismailia on the estate of Sheikh Muhammad Farghali, leader of the Muslim Brothers' battalions in Palestine.⁸³ In "*Qawl fasl*", al-Banna's pamphlet denouncing the decree of dissolution, he argued that the arms were officially recognised by the government as part of the arrangement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab League.

⁸¹ Levenberg, H., "Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945 – 1948", Frank Cass (1993), page 175.

⁸² Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 61. See also, Levenberg, H., "Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945 – 1948", Frank Cass (1993), page 88, page 176; El-Awaisi, A. A. M., "The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928 – 1947", Taurus Academic Studies (1998), page 117; Euben, R. & Zaman, M. (Eds), "Princeton Readings in Islamic Thoughts: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden", Princeton UP (2009), page 51.

⁸³ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 64.



93. In Egypt, five weeks after fighting began in Palestine, on 20 June 1948, some houses in Jewish quarter were blown up, officially explained as the accidental detonation of fireworks.⁸⁴
94. On 17 July 1948, the day after an Israeli plane dropped bombs in a poor quarter of Cairo, there was anti-foreign rioting.
95. On 19 July 1948 an explosion in lower part of the main through fare, Shari' Fu'ad destroyed parts of two large Jewish owned department stores, Circurel and Oreco, an incident blamed, by the Government and the press, on Israeli bombs.⁸⁵
96. During the last part of July and early August 1948 other Jewish-owned businesses, Benzione, Gattigneo, and the Delta Trading Company, and the Marconi Telegraph Station, regarded as the centre of Zionist communications were either destroyed or damaged by explosions.⁸⁶
97. On 22 September 1948 an explosion destroyed another part of the Jewish quarter, and on 12 November 1948 the building of the Societe Orientale de Publicite, believed to have aided Zionist activities, was

⁸⁴ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 63 - 64; See also Cohen, C. & Kolinsky, M. (Eds), "Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East, Britain's Responses to Nationalist Movements, 1943 - 55", Frank Cass (1998), page 126; Beinin, J., "The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a modern Diaspora, American University in Cairo Press (2005), page 68.

⁸⁵ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 64; Beinin, J., "The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a modern Diaspora, American University in Cairo Press (2005), page 69.

⁸⁶ Beinin, J., "The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a modern Diaspora, American University in Cairo Press (2005), page 69.



destroyed by a bomb.⁸⁷ Large numbers of people were killed or injured, but no arrests or accusations were made.

98. Amongst the papers found in the 'Jeep Case' (discussed further in Chapter 3), on 15 November 1948 were maps, memoranda and directives which clearly pointed to the responsibility of the Secret Apparatus for the terror inflicted upon the Jewish community.⁸⁸

99. In that case, police arrested the two dismounting passengers from a jeep loaded with crates outside a house in Cairo and a third who was carrying a briefcase. Documents from the third man's flat, the jeep and briefcase disclosed the first information about the Secret Apparatus. At trial, the prosecution argued that Palestine was a façade to cover the Muslim Brotherhood's real intentions of arming and training for revolution in Egypt.⁸⁹ However, the court held that the Secret Apparatus was a training apparatus in line with the goals of "liberating the Nile Valley and all Islamic countries."⁹⁰

100. On 28 November 1948, al-Banna was arrested for being implicated in the destruction of Societe Orientale de Publicite, but was released. In "*Qawl fasl*" al-Banna claimed the attacks had not been and

⁸⁷ Beinín, J., "The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a modern Diaspora, American University in Cairo Press (2005), page 68.

⁸⁸ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 75.

⁸⁹ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 14; See also Beinín, J., "The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a modern Diaspora, American University in Cairo Press (2005), page 69.

⁹⁰ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 77 – 78. See also, El-Awaisi, A. A. M., "The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928 – 1947", Taurus Academic Studies (1998), page 117.



could not be proved as ordered by the leadership, and that they were a consequence of the Palestine war and the doubtful loyalties of some of “our Jewish compatriots.”⁹¹

101. On 22 March 1948, Judge Ahmad al-Khazindar was killed on his way to work because he had sentenced a Muslim Brother to prison for attacking British soldiers in a club in Alexandria. The two assassins, members of the Secret Apparatus were sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour. In “*Qawl fasl*”, al-Banna reminded the public that the judge had laid himself open to criticism from young people by sentencing young patriots to prison for attacks on the English, and maintained that the Society could not be held responsible for acts of its members.⁹²

102. On 4 December 1948 there were widespread riots at university against armistice talks on the Palestine war. Students pelted the police force from the roof, and Cairo Commander of the Police Salim Zaki was killed by bomb thrown at him.⁹³ The Muslim Brotherhood was accused, their newspaper was closed down, and despite al-Banna’s attempts to prevent it the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved on 8 December 1948.

⁹¹ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 70.

⁹² Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 14; Zahid, M., *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis, The Politics of Liberalisation and Reform in the Middle East*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd (2012), page 74

⁹³ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 65; see also Abdalla, A., “The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt: 1923 – 1973”, American University in Cairo Press (200), page 77.



103. The decree of dissolution held that the Muslim Brotherhood intended 'the overthrow of the political order' through the 'terrorism' of its militarily trained 'rover units', and set out charges of deaths of opponents, arms and training, bombings in Cairo and Ismailia, clashes with the police, threatening letters and violence amongst labourers and farmers in the countryside.

104. On 28 December 1948 Prime Minister Nuqrashi was assassinated by 'Abd al-Majid Ahmad Hasan, a 23 year old member of the Muslim Brotherhood and veterinary student, as he entered the ministry of the interior. Al-Banna wrote a leaflet *Bayan li'l-nas* repudiating the assassination of Nuqrashi.⁹⁴ The prosecutor in the subsequent trial argued that the six months of violence prior to Nuqrashi's death was the planned prelude to his murder, and the signal for a rebellion. The training programme was evidence of the intention to indoctrinate and train for violence. The primary function of the Secret Apparatus was to bring about "the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood by force."⁹⁵

105. On 13 January 1949 there was an attempt to bomb the courthouse where the records of the jeep investigation were kept. Shafiq Ibrahim Anas, a member of the secret apparatus was arrested. al-Banna repudiated the act in public stating:

"They are neither Brothers, nor are they Muslims."

⁹⁴ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 68.

⁹⁵ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 73.



106. In “*Qawl fasl*”, al-Banna insisted that the only ones responsible for the acts are those who commit them.⁹⁶
107. Al-Banna was himself assassinated on 12 February 1949, by the political police, planned or at least condoned by the then Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Hadi.⁹⁷
108. On 5 May 1949, members of the Muslim Brotherhood failed in their attempt to assassinate ‘Abd al-Hadi, who had used oppressive measures including physical and mental torture in an attempt to quell the violence. They dispatched a barrage of bombs at a car with Hamid Juda in it; he escaped injury.
109. In October 1951 with the unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Egyptians clashed with the British forces and the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailia declared *jihad* against the British. From December 300 volunteers found their way into the Canal Zone, armed and trained by the ‘Free Officers,’ although Hudaybi denied the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation.⁹⁸
110. On 26 January 1952 in response to a major assault by the British on the Ismailia police headquarters, members of the Muslim

⁹⁶ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 70.

⁹⁷ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 71.

⁹⁸ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 89 – 90; See also Cohen, C. & Kolinsky, M. (Eds), “Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East, Britain’s Responses to Nationalist Movements, 1943 – 55”, Frank Cass (1998), page 132.



Brotherhood were involved in a devastating riot in Cairo, whereby department stores, cinemas, bars, nightclubs, social clubs, luxury food and clothing establishments, novelty shops, automobile showrooms and garages airline offices were burnt in “one massive rejection, the British, the West, the foreigner, the wealthy, and the ruler – king and pasha alike.”⁹⁹

111. In the 1952 the Muslim Brotherhood assisted Nasser’s revolution by helping to ‘maintain order and security’.¹⁰⁰

112. However, the Muslim Brotherhood quickly became dissatisfied with Nasser’s staunch secularism. By 1954, Mahmud ‘Abd al-Latif, a tinsmith from Cairo was accused of attempting to assassinate Nasser. He pleaded guilty at trial to committing acts against the present form of government by joining in a criminal conspiracy to cause insurrection and revolution, and by attempting to kill the prime minister.

113. In 1965, Sayyid Qutb, who had been released from prison in 1964, and members of Organisation 1965 were accused of plotting to assassinate Nasser, attempting to overthrow the regime and to incite a rebellion. Qutb was tried and hanged with six other members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

⁹⁹ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 93; Cohen, C. & Kolinsky, M. (Eds), “Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East, Britain’s Responses to Nationalist Movements, 1943 – 55”, Frank Cass (1998), page 134.

¹⁰⁰ Mitchell, R., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Oxford University Press (1993), page 104.



114. The following chapter expands on the organisational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood both within Egypt and internationally, identifies its key members and discusses the creation and importance of the paramilitary unit, the Secret Apparatus.



CHAPTER 3

Organisational Structure



3.1 The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

3.1.1 *Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as an Islamic movement in Egypt*

115. At the start of the 1930's the Muslim Brotherhood had emerged from an ideology espoused by a small group of individuals under the leadership of Hassan al-Banna. It was principally based in Ismailia, North-East Egypt, evolving into a wider social and Islamic movement with local branches rapidly spreading across the country.

116. By 1933, al-Banna recognised that for the Muslim Brotherhood to sustain its momentum, it required a tighter organisational structure, with an emphasis on cohesion and cooperation between districts and local branches. As membership increased, there was a drive by him to link the separate regional movements through an improved organisational structure. This would have a base in Cairo and with him as the recognised overall leader.¹⁰¹

3.1.2 *Emergence of a functional framework for growth*

117. In 1933, the first annual meeting was held in Ismailia between prominent heads of local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, which became known as the First Conference. It was during this conference that the General Guidance Council (Guidance Council) was established. This body became, and remains today, the Muslim

¹⁰¹ Lia, B., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942", Ithaca Press, (2010), page 93.



Brotherhood's highest decision-making body. The initial Guidance Council consisted, among others, of heads of local Muslim Brotherhood branches and leading members of the Cairo branch. It was affirmed that the Cairo branch would adopt a position of authority and act as the physical headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood. These developments were considered to establish a collective base upon which the Muslim Brotherhood could build.

118. Shortly after the establishment of the Guidance Council, various qualitative measures were introduced, such as a formal registration procedure for members, educational initiatives and administrative and financial arrangements. Importantly, al-Banna was keen to strengthen the spiritual unity of Muslim Brotherhood members and spread a more distinct message based on specific Islamic mores - a training programme for this purpose was therefore established.¹⁰² The importance of Islamic education was fundamental to al-Banna's vision of the Muslim Brotherhood.

119. The rapid rise of the Muslim Brotherhood across Egypt during this early period was partly due, to the vigorous publication of the group's ideas through the acquisition of local newspapers. This allowed it to propagate its message and ideology across a wider area.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Lia, B., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942", Ithaca Press, (2010), page 97.

¹⁰³ Early Muslim Brotherhood weekly newspapers included *Al-Manar*, which was later replaced by *Al-Nadhir*.



120. The Second Conference was held in 1934. One of its main achievements was to put in place a system to secure independent financing (primarily through membership fees) and to establish a printing press.¹⁰⁴ The latter would help to greatly increase and accelerate the circulation of information about the Muslim Brotherhood. This had the effect of garnering wider social awareness among the working class as well as increased support from academics and professionals. The latter group would subsequently form the core of the leadership within the Guidance Council and its various sub-committees. Younger recruits, many of them impressionable students who could be more easily moulded into the Muslim Brotherhood mindset, were key targets for expansion at the grass-roots level.

121. Another outcome of the Second Conference was the consolidation of power vested in the Guidance Council and the recognition of the supreme authority of al-Banna through the conferment on him of the title of General Guide (*al-Murshid al-amm*).¹⁰⁵

3.1.3 *Development of a concrete organisational structure*

122. The organisational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood took on a more discernable form in the mid-to-late 1930s. This featured sophisticated, hierarchical governance structures incorporating dedicated sections in charge of furthering its message among all levels

¹⁰⁴ Lia, B., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942", Ithaca Press, (2010), pages 97-98.

¹⁰⁵ Lia, B., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942", Ithaca Press, (2010), page 98.



of Egyptian society. Specific operational sections and advisory committees (both central and local) were entrusted with key functions, including: (i) propagation of the message; (ii) specialised committees for financial and; (iii) legal affairs and liaison with Muslim 'reformist' movements in other countries.

123. It is noted however that while there are variances in opinion among historians on the exact structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is a general consensus that on the national level, the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has remained essentially identical to the initial model formed in the 1930s as illustrated below.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: General Organisational Structure






Diagram based on the following source: Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1964) page 164.

3.1.3.1 Organisational structure (Egypt)

124. In the 1930s, the Muslim Brotherhood was organised with the principal aim of maximising regional growth with the command centre in Cairo and subsidiary branches spreading across the country.

125. In its basic form, the Muslim Brotherhood is divided into several administrative levels. The exact details of this division are uncertain but generally the structure is as follows: at the top is the headquarters in Cairo and the central governing bodies, the next level comprises the regional departments which are split into geographic *areas*, or *manatiq*. In 1935 there were 12 *manatiq*, growing to 20 in 1940.

126. The areas are sub-divided into district offices, known as *al-darwa'ir*, there being 89 in 1937, each with a number of local "branches".¹⁰⁶

127. The branches are divided into sub-units called *families* which would consist of around 5-6 individual members. The hierarchy of each sub-unit would be based on the level of each member's active involvement within the Muslim Brotherhood, with a higher rank attracting more benefits and greater duties and responsibilities. From

¹⁰⁶ Lia, B., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942", Ithaca Press, (2010), page 99.



the top down, the ranking levels of family members are categorised as: active member, regular member, affiliate, supporter or sympathiser.

3.1.3.2 *Central leadership structure*

128. The [leadership structure](#)¹⁰⁷ of the Muslim Brotherhood consists of three main components: (i) the General Guide; (ii) the Guidance Council, and (iii) the General Consultative (*Shura*) Council.

129. The General Guide, the first being al-Banna himself, is the supreme authority and leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and represents its ideas and ideology to the general public. He chairs the Guidance Council as well as the *Shura* Council. Traditionally, the General Guide in Egypt also serves as the head of the international Muslim Brotherhood movement. The policy and direction of the Muslim Brotherhood clearly flowed from the General Guide.

130. After al-Banna, the General Guide's were elected following procedural rules set out in the group's regulations. In 2010, further revisions took place and it was decided that the General Guide could serve up no more than two six-year terms. Previously, the majority of General Guides had been elected for life. Also appointed are one or more Deputy General Guides and an official spokesman.

¹⁰⁷ ["The Structure and Funding Sources of the Muslim Brotherhood", The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.](#)



131. The Guidance Council is the movement's highest leadership and administration body. It formulates and executes the national policy of the Muslim Brotherhood (which includes direction and monitoring of preaching, activities and the operation of its various departments) as well as its international relations.

132. The *Shura* Council is the modern equivalent of a legislature and is also chaired by the General Guide. It takes part in the formulation of the movement's overall policy and reviews the annual reports submitted by the Guidance Council, in effect acting as a check and balance. It has responsibility for logistical and administrative issues although some [sources](#) have questioned its influence since the mid-1990s, suggesting that it has now been more or less subsumed by the Guidance Council and may be considered to be defunct.¹⁰⁸

3.2 Jihad and the paramilitary branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (the "Secret Apparatus")

133. Little is known about the precise details of the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood's paramilitary unit, widely cited as the "Secret Apparatus", or "*Nizam al-khass*", but it is certainly well-established and has a background arising almost from inception of the movement. Reputable sources are of the position that the Secret Apparatus might have come into existence as a result of a compromise between al-Banna

¹⁰⁸ ["The Structure and Funding Sources of the Muslim Brotherhood", The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.](#)



and the more radical conservatives who demanded that Islamic tradition and Islamic *sharia* be implemented through force if necessary.¹⁰⁹

134. Pargeter states that the setting up of the military wing “was in line with al-Banna’s vision for the movement right from its inception.” She quotes one of the founding members of the Secret Apparatus:

“The image that [al-Banna] had in his mind since...[the inception of the Muslim Brotherhood]...was of a military group that would encapsulate the idea of jihad in Islam... He [al-Banna]...was so keen to emphasise military activity in order to demonstrate the idea of jihad [...].”¹¹⁰

135. It is generally accepted that the Secret Apparatus as a military force was formed in or around 1940 and included among its ranks senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

136. Key to the recruitment and military training of youths who joined the Secret Apparatus was the Rover Scouts. Al-Banna had been impressed by the fascist youth groups which had emerged in Italy and Germany during the 1930s and with the creation of the Rover Scouts attempted to establish an Islamic equivalent.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Pargeter, A., “The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition”, Saqi Books, 2011.

¹¹⁰ Pargeter, A., “The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition”, Saqi Books, 2011.

¹¹¹ Lia, B., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942”, Ithaca Press, (2010), page 167.



137. The training of the Rover Scouts would not be merely physical but included a focus on *jihad* and martyrdom. Indeed, as is well documented by his tracts published in “*Al-Nadhir*” at the time, al-Banna tried to instil a willingness to die for the cause in these members by constantly associating *jihad* with the possibility of death at any time. Recruiting young men through the Rover Scouts and indoctrinating them in this manner (through relentless mantra, study and training) ensured that members would be consumed by the concept of *jihad* and martyrdom.¹¹² Many of the Rover Scouts were however to be only foot soldiers. The leadership of the Secret Apparatus was reserved for the elite members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of who were influential members of the Guidance Council (including two who subsequently become General Guides).

138. Al-Banna started building this military wing under the banner of ‘excursion groups’ run by the Rover Scouts. The Rover Scouts capitalised on anti-colonial sentiment and revolutionary spirit among the Egyptian youth at the time, their eagerness to fight against the ‘colonial oppressor’ conveniently feeding into the Muslim Brotherhood propaganda machine. The young were also enticed by this new unit’s secrecy and mystique as some sort of covert, heroic fighting force.¹¹³

139. Although attempts were made to keep the formation of this new military unit covert so as not to attract attention from the authorities,

¹¹² El-Awaisi, A., “Jihadia: Education and the Society of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers: 1928 – 49”, 21(2) J. Beliefs & Values (2000), page 222.

¹¹³ Lia, B., “The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942”, Ithaca Press, (2010), pages 167-170.



there was a deliberate transformation into a secret, trained, well-armed and well-funded military unit. The establishment of a military wing was a reaction not only to what was happening in Egypt at that time; but also as funds and arms were smuggled to help the Palestine struggle, the Muslim Brotherhood was also spreading its wings into international conflicts. The discreet strategy to use violence to further its ambitions was to become synonymous with the Muslim Brotherhood's clandestine reputation, and remains so today.

140. During the early 1940s, the militarisation of the Muslim Brotherhood had escalated, although they went largely unnoticed during the Second World War. The violent nature of the Secret Apparatus soon became apparent when the unit was led by the militant senior Muslim Brotherhood member, Abdel Rahman al-Sanadi.

141. While its early involvement in anti-establishment attacks against the British did not distinguish it from many other rebel groups at the time, the incident, which was to establish its notoriety, was the assassination in 1948 of the prominent Egyptian judge, Ahmed al-Khazindar. Al-Khazindar had sentenced some of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood to prison for attacks on the British and the reprisal against him was his execution.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 62.



142. In 1948, two major incidents happened which put the Muslim Brotherhood firmly on the map. First, a young member of the Muslim Brotherhood assassinated Prime Minister Nuqrashi; and second, a member of the Secret Apparatus attempted a bomb attack on a Cairo courthouse. Al-Banna, who tried to distance himself from these actions, which caused already tense relations with senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood to boil over, wrote a pamphlet in response to these incidents. This was entitled "*Qawl Fasl*" and denied any involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood. The existence of the Secret Apparatus was however uncovered in November 1948 in the so-called "Jeep incident" where the police, investigating the Muslim Brotherhood following the assassination of Al-Khazindar a few months earlier, [found an abandoned jeep in Ismailia with documents regarding the Secret Apparatus and its violent activities.](#)¹¹⁵ The information found included references to famous assassinations and bombings and was used as evidence in the trials against several Muslim Brotherhood members.¹¹⁶ A clampdown soon followed.

143. Following the assassination of al-Banna in 1949 and the government crackdown on its senior members, a large number of Muslim Brotherhood members were arrested and imprisoned by the Egyptian government. The group was thrown into disarray and was without a new leader. Two years later, Hassan al-Hudaybi was

¹¹⁵ [Rubin, B. "The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist", Palgrave Macmillan, 25 May 2010, page 41.](#)

¹¹⁶ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 78; also see paras 98-99.



eventually appointed the new General Guide to provide a public face that concealed a strong corps of militancy within the leadership.

144. Al-Hudaybi's appointment invoked dissent among many senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood as they were infuriated by his plans to disband the Secret Apparatus.¹¹⁷ Al-Hudaybi was considered weak and easily manipulated by those who were hardliners set out to exploit this position. His leadership was further undermined by the fact that many moderate members who supported him also regarded the Secret Apparatus as "glorious" and a Muslim Brotherhood without it was unthinkable.

145. The Secret Apparatus clearly wielded significant power within the upper echelons of the Muslim Brotherhood and it was made clear to al-Hudaybi that his role as leader was to be the public face of moderation and nothing more. Key decisions on policy and operations were to be taken by senior members of the Guidance Council, which was dominated by the Secret Apparatus.¹¹⁸

146. Upon President Gamal Abdel Nasser coming to power in 1952, the radical leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood initially supported him as they believed he would usher in Islamic rule. When they realised this would not be the case, the Secret Apparatus insisted that radical action be taken against the Nasser government. This reached a

¹¹⁷ Pargeter, A., "The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition", Saqi Books, 2011.

¹¹⁸ Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), pages 87-89.



climax in 1954 with a failed assassination attempt of President Nasser at a speech in Alexandria known as the “Manshia Incident”. As a result, Nasser ordered the group’s dissolution. The Muslim Brotherhood was for a time, at least, restricted in influence and power.

147. For the next several decades the Muslim Brotherhood stagnated and its membership dropped significantly. However, an Islamic resurgence was to take place in the 1960s when a new wave of radical and anti-government sentiment emerged amongst the student population. These developments, galvanised by the radical ideas of the influential Islamic scholar, Sayyid Qutb, lent a new lease of life to the militant element of the Muslim Brotherhood. This was to dramatically shape the group’s future course and set the foundations for its strategy and purpose, still evident to this day. The Secret Apparatus was to be fundamental to this strategy.

148. Time would prove that the Secret Apparatus leaders were not tempered by their time in prison or by being forced to live and operate outside Egypt. These members, most of whom had been recruited to the Secret Apparatus in the 1940s, were already in elite positions as members of the Secret Apparatus. At the time, the Secret Apparatus still held authority with many of the next generation of Muslim Brotherhood leaders.

149. Once outside of Egypt, the former Secret Apparatus leaders and their colleagues who had already been among the most prominent



members of the group were able to operate from a privileged position without government interference. While abroad, many of them built fortunes through the opportunities for work in Europe and the oil-rich Gulf countries. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood back in Egypt became dependent on them for financing, which enabled these wealthy, prominent members to wield significant influence on the group from outside the country.

150. In the 1970s, President Sadat released many of the Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt believing they had renounced violence. This would prove to be a fatal mistake. Once released, these members set about recruiting students from university campus Islamic cells. These senior members would form the backbone of the future Muslim Brotherhood leadership with their influence still very much felt within the Muslim Brotherhood today.

151. The influence of the Secret Apparatus on current international Islamic 'terrorist' groups such as al-Qa'ida, particularly since the death of the reformist General Guide, Umar al-Tilimsani, in 1986, is evident. Assam Sultan, another reformist figure, acknowledged that when al-Tilimsani died, the reformist movement that had started within the Muslim Brotherhood died with him. Despite al-Tilimsani's apparent efforts to reform the Muslim Brotherhood and adopt a more moderate strategy, the movement remained in the grip of the Secret Apparatus members. Although many of them were exiled for several decades, they acted as 'back-room controllers' and their gradual return to Egypt



after his death marked the resurgence of this core leadership group. This group re-embraced the jihadist philosophy started by al-Banna and promoted by Sayyid Qutb.

152. The impact of Mashhour, al-Malat and Sananiri (and Akef) on the Muslim Brotherhood today should not be understated and their individual and collective influence is discussed further below.

3.3 Key figures of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

3.3.1 Past leaders who significantly influenced the culture and direction of the Muslim Brotherhood

3.3.1.1 Hassan al-Banna

153. As the first General Guide and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, he remains its most revered figure. His ideology of a global Islamic *caliphate* remains the driving ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Further, his apparent willingness to engage in violence to further the group's aims has seen the concept of Islamic *jihad* emerge through the Secret Apparatus he established in 1940. Its influence permeates the ethos of the Egyptian and international Muslim Brotherhood today, camouflaged by the guise of outward political moderation and religious tolerance.



3.3.1.2 *Mustafa Mashhour*

154. In his [book](#), “*Jihad is the Way*”,¹¹⁹ Mashhour sets out his radical and often militant vision for the Muslim Brotherhood and the fundamental concepts of its ideology. This includes the Muslim Brotherhood’s goal of: (i) establishing an Islamic state; (ii) world domination under Islam; (iii) the public and personal religious duty of military jihad; (iv) and the warning not to rush to jihad until it is prepared and timed for maximum benefit.

3.3.1.3 *Mohammed Mahdi Akef*

155. Akef was the movement’s seventh General Guide (2004 to 2010) and the first in history to voluntarily step down (in 2010) while still alive. He was one of the leaders of the Secret Apparatus and involved in the assassination attempt of President Nasser. In 2005, a year after he was appointed General Guide, he [publicly denied the Holocaust](#) and sided with then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s anti-Western views. Akef [stated](#) that he wished to:

"expose the false American rule which has become a nightmare of a new world order".¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ [“PMW Bulletins: Translation of important Muslim Brotherhood book: Jihad is the way”](#)

¹²⁰ [“Egyptian Islamists deny Holocaust”, BBC News website, 23 December 2005.](#)



3.3.2 Leaders of Secret Apparatus and their position of influence in the Muslim Brotherhood

156. Mustafa Mashhour, Kamal Sananiri, Ahmad al-Malat, Ahmad Hassanein, and Mohammed Mahdi Akef were Secret Apparatus operatives from the 1940s and 1950s who became wealthy leaders of the group in the late 1970s and 1980s.¹²¹ Unlike most members of the Muslim Brotherhood, these men were from wealthy families and were able to fund the Secret Apparatus themselves - a position which gave them automatic senior status within the Muslim Brotherhood.

157. Once in the elite Secret Apparatus, they were well-placed to become prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership.¹²² The generation of Secret Apparatus operatives that preceded the Mashhour faction had been engaged in a power struggle with General Guide Hassan Al-Hudaybi, right up to the latter's death in 1973. The Mashhour faction was one Secret Apparatus generation younger and had been one degree removed from the 1950s and 1960s power struggle. However, beginning in the mid-1970s, the benefits of their time abroad enabled them to ascend to the highest echelons of the Muslim Brotherhood over the heads of Al-Hudaybi's successor, the

¹²¹ Lia, B., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942", Ithaca Press (2010), pages 39; Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), page 30.

¹²² Mitchell, R., "The Society of the Muslim Brothers", Oxford University Press (1993), pages 76-78.



new General Guide, the moderate Umar Al-Tilimsani, and his supporters in Cairo.

158. Mashhour and, more recently, Akef were both to assume the role of General Guide, demonstrating the enduring authority of members of the Secret Apparatus and their powerful position within the Muslim Brotherhood.

3.3.3 Most prominent theologians and ideologists encouraged violent jihad

159. Some of the most influential Islamic scholars who arguably had the biggest influence on the strategy and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood included Hassan al-Banna himself (although not regarded as an Islamic scholar as such). More notable scholars were Sayyid Qutb, whose teachings formed the basis of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology as well as those of several current Islamic 'terrorist' groups and more recently Mohammed al-Ghazali and Yusuf al-Qaradawi.

160. Mohammed al-Ghazali was an Islamic cleric and prolific scholar whose writings are reported to have influenced generations of Egyptians. Although often presented as a moderate, he demonstrated extremist views. One notable instance was when he testified on behalf of the members of members of Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, a designated terrorist group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Members of the group had been accused of assassinating author and human rights activist, Farag Foda, for blasphemy. Al-Ghazali testified before an



Egyptian court that anyone who openly resisted the full imposition of Islamic law was an apostate who should be killed. Al-Ghazali later defended his position stating:

"The killing of Farag Foda was in fact the implementation of the punishment against an apostate which the imam (the Islamic leader in Egypt) has failed to implement."¹²³

161. His extremist views were echoed by perhaps the most influential of all the Islamic scholars who came to define the theological nature and ethos of the Muslim Brotherhood - Sayyid Qutb.

162. The central role of Sayyid Qutb in establishing, since the 1960s, a firm theological foundation and philosophy with which the Muslim Brotherhood could identify and make their own, cannot be understated and is discussed in more depth in Chapter 4.

3.3.4 Current leadership

3.3.4.1 Mohamed Badie

163. Badie, the current General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood has been [heavily influenced by the ideas of radical scholar Sayyid](#)

¹²³ Darwish, N., "Cruel and Usual Punishment: The Terrifying Global Implications of Islamic Law", Thomas Nelson (2008), page 144.



[Outb](#)¹²⁴ as well as leaders of the Secret Apparatus. This is apparent from several controversial statements he has made since being elected General Guide in January 2010. He has on various occasions made statements in support of al-Qassam Brigades (see Chapter 4) and that *jihad* is a duty of all Muslims. In a 2010 speech he claimed:

“Arab and Muslim regimes are betraying their people by failing to confront the Muslims’ real enemies: not only Israel but also the United States. Waging jihad against both of these infidels is a commandment of Allah... Governments have no right to stop their people from fighting the United States.”

164. Despite his position as General Guide, his Deputy General Guides, Khairat Shater, Mahmoud Ghozlan and Mahmoud Ezzat, all of whom are reported to be strict, albeit covert, adherents of conservative Qutbism and enthusiastic supporters of violent jihad, are generally considered more influential within the Muslim Brotherhood.

165. Badie was arrested, along with Shater and many other Muslim Brotherhood leaders, in July 2013 on grounds of inciting violence leading to the death of 50 people during the mass demonstrations in Cairo against the overthrow of President Morsi. He was sentenced to life in prison in September 2014.

¹²⁴ [“Profiles of prominent Muslim Brotherhood figures in Egypt”, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.](#)



166. While it [appears that Badie has retained his position as General Guide¹²⁵](#) despite his incarceration, [it has been suggested that deputy guides \(among them, Mahmoud Ezzat\) have assumed increased leadership responsibilities in his absence.¹²⁶](#)

3.3.4.2 *Khairat Shater*

167. Shater has been the Deputy General Guide since January 2004 and is currently in custody awaiting a retrial in respect of his role of inciting violence against government officials in the events of April 2013 in Cairo. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1974, has been a member of the Guidance Council since 1995 and is recognised as one of the movement's most influential strategists.

168. Prior to his current detention, Shater has been detained several times (starting in 1968), notably in 1995 (for five years), and in 2007 (for seven years) on [charges of financing terrorism and money laundering following the infamous Al-Azhar student militia revolt in December 2006](#),¹²⁷ where he was arrested with other Muslim Brotherhood members for allegedly providing combat training and weapons to student protestors.

¹²⁵ ["Muslim Brotherhood Mourns Scholar and Senior Leader Gomaa Ameen", Ikhwanweb, 25 January 2015.](#)

¹²⁶ ["Who's who in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood", BBC News website, 28 April 2014.](#)

¹²⁷ [El-Naggar, M., "Egypt Arrests Opposition Leaders After a Protest", New York Times, 15 December 2006.](#)



169. The extent of divide between the increasingly militant ideology of the student supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and the more moderate academic establishment of Al-Azhar University was apparent from the [response of the University's President, Ahmed el-Tayeb](#), who claimed that the number and influence of Brotherhood-affiliated students had grown steadily in the last two years. He stated:

"They now control the university mosques, using them as forums to attack Al-Azhar's moderate Islam and discredit its clerics."¹²⁸

170. Shater, a millionaire businessman and the owner of the computer technology company Salsabiel, is also known to be the economic brain of the movement and one of its main financiers.

3.3.4.3 *Mahmoud Ezzat*

171. Ezzat is a Deputy General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood and one of its most influential members. Ezzat has been personified as the Brotherhood's "iron man," embodying its reputation for top-down decision-making and the culture of obedience and radical Islamic indoctrination of student activists.

172. Despite his leading role, he has kept a low profile and in December 2012 [was singled out as the organisation's "most dangerous](#)

¹²⁸ [Morrow, A., "Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood In the Dock Again", Inter Press Service News Agency, 23 January 2007.](#)



[man](#)", by an academic Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, who described him as a "big enigma".¹²⁹

3.3.4.4 *Mahmoud Ghozlan*

173. Ghozlan is the official spokesman of the Muslim Brotherhood and a member of the *Shura* Council. Ghozlan served as secretary-general of the group until his arrest in February 2002. He was released in August 2005 and re-imprisoned from March to October 2007. Ghozlan is considered among the Muslim Brotherhood's hardline leaders. His position in respect of violent jihad is often revealed in his public statements, such as when he accused former Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman of being an "aide to the Jews". He has also stated that he does not believe widespread reports regarding the persecution of Christians in Egypt – a position in step with the Muslim Brotherhood's propaganda that they (the members of the movement) are the persecuted ones.

3.3.4.5 *Sheikh Abdullah al-Khatib*

174. Al-Khatib was the movement's former mufti and member of the Guidance Council until his resignation in November 2008. He was considered a possible candidate for General Guide in 2004. The reverence in which he is held among the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood is revealing in that [al-Khatib holds strong conservative](#)

¹²⁹ ["Who's who in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood", BBC News website, 28 April 2014.](#)



[and radical views, encouraging, among other things, the destruction of existing churches and the cessation of construction of new ones,](#)¹³⁰ and is opposed to the election of Copts and women to senior posts.

3.3.4.6 *Muhammad al-Beltagy*

175. Al-Beltagy is a member of the People's Assembly and is one of the Muslim Brotherhood's most prominent and charismatic political figures. He first became acquainted with the group while in high school in Alexandria, where he was considered a student leader.

176. Although outwardly moderate, al-Beltagy is firmly entrenched in the hardline factions of the Muslim Brotherhood. His direct involvement in or support of militant Islamist groups is unclear. From what is known about him, his tacit acceptance of (illustrated too by his refusal to condemn) the radical and militant elements and activities of the Muslim Brotherhood belies his moderate facade.

3.3.4.7 *Subhi Saleh*

177. Saleh is one of the primary legal experts within the Muslim Brotherhood and is considered among its most radical political figures. He once [responded during a March 2011 speech at al-Azhar University](#) as to whether the Muslim Brotherhood would be able to establish an Islamic state to everyone's liking:

¹³⁰ ["Profiles of prominent Muslim Brotherhood figures in Egypt", The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.](#)



“The Copts are deadlocked because they don’t want an Islamic state. But not us.”¹³¹

3.3.4.8 *Saber Abouel Fotouh*

178. Abouel Fotouh holds the position of Chair of the Workforce Committee within the People’s Assembly. Having risen through the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood since his involvement as a student, Abouel Fotouh's political views tend to be hardline Islamic conservative. He has often [argued for the imposition of Islamic rule and that Christians should not be allowed to criticize Islamic law.](#)¹³²

3.4 The International Muslim Brotherhood

3.4.1 *The international Muslim Brotherhood network and its relationship with Egypt*

179. The international organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, known as *Tanzim al Dawli*, is a network of national organisations that have sprung from the basic ideology originated by al-Banna and refined over the years by various Egyptian as well as international Muslim Brotherhood leaders. It is believed that the international

¹³¹ [Trager, E., et al “Who's Who in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood”, The Washington Institute, September 2012.](#)

¹³² [Trager, E., et al “Who's Who in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood”, The Washington Institute, September 2012.](#)



Muslim Brotherhood was [formally established in 1982¹³³](#) by the future General Guide, and one of the former leaders of the Secret Apparatus, Mustafa Mashhour. However, as has been shown, its expansion outside Egypt started much earlier.

180. It is now a highly influential part of the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood with voting rights that shape policy and elect the core leadership including the General Guide.

181. The underlying purpose and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood always had at its core the establishment of a global Islamic movement. Soon after the Muslim Brotherhood movement had started to gather momentum in Egypt in the mid-1930s, it began to establish connections abroad, mainly through personal contacts of its members and by foreign students who were doing graduate work at Al-Azhar or in other Cairo universities and who were open to the ideas of Hassan al-Banna.

182. Al-Banna himself, in the movement's early years, gave a high priority to establishing relations with similar Islamic movements across the Middle East and made personal contact with several foreign Islamic leaders. This, coupled with visits from Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood missionaries to various countries (including Palestine and Syria in 1935), gave rise to the concept of an international Muslim Brotherhood framework.

¹³³ [Rashwan, D., "Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt", Ikhwanweb, 13 June 2007.](#)



183. Many of the early foreign connections of the Muslim Brotherhood were not branches per se, but Islamic movements either influenced by or dedicated to the values and teachings of al-Banna. The international Muslim Brotherhood leadership symbolically remains vested in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leadership as represented by the General Guide and the International Guidance Council. Significantly, the General Guide is the only one to carry the title of *Murshid*, while the leaders of branches outside of Egypt are referred to within the Muslim Brotherhood as either “Secretary Generals” or “General Supervisors”.

184. The international Muslim Brotherhood is organized in the various constituent states so that they follow the decisions made by the international movement’s leadership consisting of the General Guide, the International Guidance Council, and the International Shura Council on membership conditions and general policy. In addition, they must secure the approval of the International Guidance Council before making important political decisions.

185. Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the various countries are required to consult and reach an agreement with the General Guide or the International Guidance Council before making decisions on local issues that may affect the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries. The national leaders outside Egypt do exercise a significant degree of independent authority over the local branch’s action plan, policy,



activity, organisational development, and positions on local affairs as long as they have no bearing on the Muslim Brotherhood in other states, provided they do not conflict with the group's collective strategy.

186. National branches are required to pay a [specified annual amount](#)¹³⁴ to the International Muslim Brotherhood as determined with the International Guidance Council.

187. In a [2009 interview with London Al-Quds Al-Arabi Online](#),¹³⁵ then General Guide Mohammed Mahdi Akef, gave details about the composition of the international Muslim Brotherhood structure. Akef explained that the International Shura Council consists of 90 members from inside Egypt and 40 from outside. It is the International Shura Council who elect the General Guide, making Akef's appointment more international than in earlier times.

188. There is no bar in the rules of the Muslim Brotherhood to elect a non-Egyptian General Guide but to date this has not happened. The International Guidance Council consists of eight Egyptians and five non-Egyptians. Representation on the International Shura Council is apportioned to countries or regions with the most members, such as Jordan, Syria, the Gulf states, Malaysia, Indonesia and Europe, and each candidate should be a prominent person in the Islamic world.

¹³⁴ ["The Structure and Funding Sources of the Muslim Brotherhood", The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.](#)

¹³⁵ ["International Organization Of The Muslim Brotherhood", The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch, 17 January 2015.](#)



189. There is thereby international cooperation and support between leaders of the global Muslim Brotherhood for collective as well as country-specific struggles.

3.4.2 *The Muslim Brotherhood in Arab countries*

190. The first Muslim Brotherhood 'branches' started emerging in the Arab world in the 1930s and 1940s. There was no formal arrangement in place at this time and alliances between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Arab branches were formed naturally through personal liaison. After 1945, the Muslim Brotherhood established a "Communications Bureau", similar to a type of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the Islamic world to formalize contacts and the network it had created.

191. Over time, the non-Egyptian [Arab branches grew in influence within their respective countries](#),¹³⁶ most notably in Syria, which was to develop into one of the largest Muslim Brotherhood branches outside Egypt. Important Muslim Brotherhood branches also emerged and became established in Jordan, Algeria, Turkey, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Persian and Gulf states. Subsidiary organisations such as Hamas also developed on the Palestinian scene.

¹³⁶ ["The Muslim Brotherhood in other Arab countries and in Europe", The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.](#)



3.4.3 *The Muslim Brotherhood in European countries*

192. The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when Said Ramadan, the son-in-law of Hassan Al-Banna, [founded](#)¹³⁷ a mosque in Munich. Since that time, [Muslim Brotherhood branches or affiliate Islamic organisations have been established in most E.U. countries](#)¹³⁸ as well as many non-E.U. countries such as Russia and Turkey.

193. The international Muslim Brotherhood also includes Saudi institutions, many of which were founded by members who settled in the country. These include the [Muslim World League](#)¹³⁹ and the [World Assembly of Muslim Youth](#)¹⁴⁰, both of which were created to propagate Saudi 'Wahhabi' Islam, an ultra-conservative version of Islam. These organisations, as well as Islamic organisations in other parts of the world, operate as a network sharing similar ideology, backgrounds, funding, and institutional links. They hold conferences that are attended by [leading members](#)¹⁴¹ of the Muslim Brotherhood in their respective countries as well as within the global movement.

¹³⁷ [Johnson, I., "A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West" \(Synopsis\).](#)

¹³⁸ ["The Muslim Brotherhood in other Arab countries and in Europe", The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.](#)

¹³⁹ ["The Muslim World League", The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch.](#)

¹⁴⁰ ["World Assembly of Muslim Youth", The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch.](#)

¹⁴¹ ["11th Palestinians In Europe Conference To Be Held In Brussels; GMB/Hamas Speakers Featured", The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch.](#)



3.4.4 *Global ideology and political integration*

194. National branches and/or affiliates of the international Muslim Brotherhood exhibit similar patterns of activity, albeit influenced by the social and political conditions in their respective countries.

195. The Muslim Brotherhood's [integration into the political establishment](#)¹⁴² was easier in Arab countries due to common cultural and religious values. However, through speeches and publications of its senior members, the Muslim Brotherhood would reveal its underlying ambition, to ultimately establish a *caliphate*, and was therefore in conflict with the authorities as well as members of the general public.

196. In Tunisia, Ennahda, a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated party was shaped by the radical ideas of Sayyid Qutb and attained considerable influence in the 1980s where it supported the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979. It was described in the 1980s, by a British journalist as “the single most threatening opposition force in Tunis”¹⁴³ and its members were involved in acts of terrorism through the [bombing of tourist hotels](#).¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² [“The Muslim Brotherhood in other Arab countries and in Europe”, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.](#)

¹⁴³ Wright, R., “Sacred Rage”, Simon and Schuster (2001), page 194 (author interview 29 November 1984).

¹⁴⁴ [Hammer, J., “In a Worried Corner of Tunis”, The New York Review of Books, 27 October 2011.](#)



197. In Syria in the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood led a [military uprising](#),¹⁴⁵ which included the city of Hama.

198. In the Palestinian Territories, Hamas took part in the 2006 parliament elections when it defeated its then political opponents, Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.

3.4.5 *Political tactics*

199. To avoid public exposure, the Muslim Brotherhood operates in most Arab countries through front parties which become integrated into the political arena. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan established the Islamic Action Front; in Algeria it established the Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (MSP); in Lebanon Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya; in Morocco, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD); in Tunisia it established the Al-Nahda party and in Kuwait it established the Islamic Constitutional Movement. In Syria, however, the movement has retained its Muslim Brotherhood identity, even though in the past year its leader has expressed willingness to turn it into a political party. In Saudi Arabia it was prohibited from establishing a party.

200. In some countries such as Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait, the Muslim Brotherhood's integration into government institutions has

¹⁴⁵ [“The Muslim Brotherhood in other Arab countries and in Europe”, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.](#)



been a catalyst for internal tension and disagreements as it prefers to be in opposition and confront the regime. A recent [report](#) states,

“Less publicly, the international Muslim Brotherhood branches and supporters are often associated with fundamentalism, anti-Semitism, ... While claiming to disavow Al-Qaeda linked terrorism, the Muslim Brotherhood are at best lukewarm in their condemnation of Islamist violence and commonly issue statements justifying and supporting such violence.” ¹⁴⁶

3.5 Concluding remarks

201. The influence and global reach of the Muslim Brotherhood today is testament to the endurance of its underlying ideology first presented by al-Banna in 1928.

202. It quickly became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood has two faces; one is a public face that preaches moderation to secure political advancement, while behind the scenes it is gradually consolidating social and political support through propaganda so as to further its ultimate goal of creating an Islamic state.

203. The next chapter will discuss the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and its links to other militant Islamist groups.

¹⁴⁶ [“Global Muslim Brotherhood”, The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch, 17 January 2015.](#)



CHAPTER 4

Muslim Brotherhood And Militant Islamist Groups



4.1 Introduction

204. The close association between the Muslim Brotherhood and militant Islamist groups such as al-Qa'ida, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Islamic State, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and Sinai Province goes beyond a superficial regional link. These actors all share the same fundamental ideological values that have their roots in the Muslim Brotherhood.

205. As a result, irrespective of the variant in tools used, the Muslim Brotherhood continues to provide material support to these militant Islamist groups. In doing so, the Muslim Brotherhood aims to edge closer to its own ultimate purpose - the creation of a pan-Islamic *caliphate* via the promotion and use of violent means.

4.2 Muslim Brotherhood and the origins of militant Islamist groups

206. Tracing the origins of the various militant Islamist groups clearly shows that the roots of such groups lay within the Muslim Brotherhood. As held by former Kuwaiti MP, Dr. Ahmad al-Rab'i, ultimately the founders of most modern terrorist groups in the Middle East emerged from the [mantle of the Muslim brotherhood](#).¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ ["Former Kuwaiti Education Minister: All of Al-Qaida's Terrorism Started from the Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood", Memri, 26 July 2005.](#)



4.2.1 *Origins of al- Qa'ida*

207. Al-Qa'ida is a global militant Islamist network, named as a terrorist organisation and [subject to UN sanctions in 2000](#).¹⁴⁸ The network was established amidst the [decade-long conflict](#)¹⁴⁹ between the Soviet Union and the Afghani resistance following the former's occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979.

208. It is widely acknowledged that the network was founded by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi citizen who had [travelled to Afghanistan to assist the Afghan resistance in the early 1980's](#).¹⁵⁰ However, the network was not established by bin Laden alone.

209. The al-Qa'ida network was established towards the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan between 1988 and 1989 by leading figures within the Muslim Brotherhood international networks. Documents of minutes of meetings held in August 1988 are said to reveal the formation of al-Qa'ida and those present at the meeting which include Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and Aballah Yusuf Azzam.¹⁵¹ All three individuals had direct links to the Muslim Brotherhood.

¹⁴⁸ [S/Res/1333 \(2000\)](#), adopted by the Security Council at its 4251st meeting, on 19 December 2000. Al-Qa'ida is also designated as a terrorist organisation by a number of states including, *inter alia*, the [U.S \(1999\)](#) and [U.K \(2001\)](#).

¹⁴⁹ ["Russia and Afghanistan", Institute for the Study of War.](#)

¹⁵⁰ ["The life and death of Osama bin Laden", Washington Post, 2 May 2011.](#)

¹⁵¹ Asthana, N., & Nirmal, A., "Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities", Pointer Publishers (2009), page 108.



4.2.1.1 *Abdallah Yusuf Azzam*

210. Abdallah Yusuf Azzam was a Palestinian Sunni Islamic scholar described as the [father of modern jihad](#).¹⁵² He was a key member of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, having joined the group in the mid-1950's and introduced to the works of Hassan al-Banna.¹⁵³ A decade later, Azzam travelled to Cairo to study at Al-Azhar University, during which he found himself at the centre of the Islamist movement with direct access to Sayyid Qutb and subsequently was referred to as a [disciple of Qutb](#).¹⁵⁴

211. Following the execution of Qutb in 1966, Azzam travelled back to Jordan where he rapidly rose through the ranks of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁵⁵ Azzam was a prolific religious scholar who lectured and published extensively across the region.¹⁵⁶ Having been described as the 'Jordanian Sayyid Qutb', he became one of the five members of the *Majlis al-Shura*, or the Shura Council.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² [Reidal, B., "The 9/11 Attacks' Spiritual Father", Brookings, 11 September 2011.](#)

¹⁵³ Rosen, R., "Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World", Nations Book (2010), page 131.

¹⁵⁴ "Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States", 9/11 Commission, 22 July 2004 available at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>

¹⁵⁵ Kepel, G. and Milelli, G., "Al Qaeda in Its Own Words", Belknap Press (2010), page 89.

¹⁵⁶ Shavit, U., "Islamism and the West: From "Cultural Attack" to "Missionary Migrant", Routledge Studies in Political Islam (2013), page 17.

¹⁵⁷ Kepel, G. and Milelli, G., "Al Qaeda in Its Own Words", Belknap Press (2010), page 89.



212. In 1980 Azzam began teaching at the King Abdul Ibn Saud University in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.¹⁵⁸ It is believed that he secured this position through his connections with the Muslim Brotherhood. Mohammed Qutb, best known as the brother of Sayyid Qutb, was already employed at the university and likely assisted Azzam to secure employment there.¹⁵⁹ Osama bin Laden was also enrolled at the [King Abdul Ibn Saud University between 1976 and 1981](#).¹⁶⁰

213. Having left Saudi Arabia, Azzam went on to assist the Afghan resistance, travelling to Peshwar to set up guest-houses for would-be jihadists and military training camps.¹⁶¹ It was in Peshwar that Azzam established the *Maktab al-Khidimat* alongside Osama bin Laden.¹⁶² Translated as Bureau of Services, the *Maktab al-Khidimat* was established as a support network to channel funds to *jihadi* recruits in Afghanistan.¹⁶³ With Azzam leading the group, bin Laden was a key member in securing finances.¹⁶⁴ In short, the *Maktab* acted as a platform for al-Qa'ida following the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan and Azzam himself has been described as “help[ing] bring about the

¹⁵⁸ Kepel, G. and Milelli, G., “Al Qaeda in Its Own Words”, Belknap Press (2010), page 90.

¹⁵⁹ Kepel, G. and Milelli, G., “Al Qaeda in Its Own Words”, Belknap Press (2010),

¹⁶⁰ [“Osama bin Laden”, The Biography](#).

¹⁶¹ Kepel, G. and Milelli, G., “Al Qaeda in Its Own Words”, Belknap Press (2010), page 92.

¹⁶² Mendelsohn, B., “Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War”, University Of Chicago Press (2009), page 41.

¹⁶³ Kepel, G. and Milelli, G., “Al Qaeda in Its Own Words”, Belknap Press (2010), page 93.

¹⁶⁴ Scheuer, M., “Through Our Enemies' Eyes”, Potomac Books (2007), page 106.



mobilisation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement more than any other leader".¹⁶⁵

4.2.1.2 *Ayman Zawahiri*

214. The current leader of al-Qa'ida is an Egyptian citizen who went on to establish the [Egyptian Islamic Jihad](#) movement.¹⁶⁶ Prior to this, Zawahiri had joined the Muslim Brotherhood at a young age following the influence of his uncle Mahfouz Azzam.¹⁶⁷

215. Mahfouz Azzam was the legal advisor for the Muslim Brotherhood and close confidante of Sayyid Qutb.¹⁶⁸ Ayman Zawahiri was significantly influenced by the rhetoric of his uncle in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁶⁹ Zawahiri became a devout follower of Sayyid Qutb, which existed in his subsequent Islamic works.¹⁷⁰

216. Following Qutb's execution in 1966, Zawahiri formed a cell as part of the Muslim Brotherhood to assist the establishment of an

¹⁶⁵ Emerson, S., "Abdullah Assam: The Man Before Osama Bin Laden", Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International (1998).

¹⁶⁶ ["Egyptian Islamic Jihad", Stanford University, 9 August 2012.](#)

¹⁶⁷ Bird, K., "Crossing Mandelbaum Gate: Coming of Age Between the Arabs and Israelis, 1956-1978", Scribner (2010), page 188.

¹⁶⁸ Bird, K., "Crossing Mandelbaum Gate: Coming of Age Between the Arabs and Israelis, 1956-1978", Scribner (2010), page 188.

¹⁶⁹ Bird, K., "Crossing Mandelbaum Gate: Coming of Age Between the Arabs and Israelis, 1956-1978", Scribner (2010), page 188. See also ["Interview With Ayman Al Zawahiri's Uncle" \(2006\).](#)

¹⁷⁰ Bird, K., "Crossing Mandelbaum Gate: Coming of Age Between the Arabs and Israelis, 1956-1978", Scribner (2010), page 188.



Islamic *caliphate* which would replace the Nasser regime in Egypt.¹⁷¹ Although the cell began with five students, by 1974 it had grown to over forty members with Zawahiri as *emir*, or leader, of the cell.¹⁷²

217. In 1980, Zawahiri travelled to Pakistan to provide medical assistance to the Afghan cause following an [invite by a Muslim Brotherhood](#) member who ran a clinic in Pakistan.¹⁷³ Upon his return from Pakistan, Zawahiri established the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement and was subsequently put on trial and detained for the assassination of President Sadat alongside a significant number of Muslim Brotherhood members.¹⁷⁴

218. Following his release from detention, Zawahiri travelled to Pakistan via Saudi Arabia.¹⁷⁵ It was here that he assisted the *Maktab al-Khidimat* alongside Abdallah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. Forging links with bin Laden, Zawahiri went on to become instrumental in the theological direction taken by al-Qa'ida.

¹⁷¹ Bird, K., "Crossing Mandelbaum Gate: Coming of Age Between the Arabs and Israelis, 1956-1978", Scribner (2010), page 189.

¹⁷² Bird, K., "Crossing Mandelbaum Gate: Coming of Age Between the Arabs and Israelis, 1956-1978", Scribner (2010), page 189.

¹⁷³ ["Ayman Zawahiri", GlobalSecurity.org, 7 November 2011.](#)

¹⁷⁴ Bird, K., "Crossing Mandelbaum Gate: Coming of Age Between the Arabs and Israelis, 1956-1978", Scribner (2010), page 189.

¹⁷⁵ Bird, K., "Crossing Mandelbaum Gate: Coming of Age Between the Arabs and Israelis, 1956-1978", Scribner (2010), page 189.



4.2.1.3 *Osama bin Laden*

219. As well as the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood's Abdallah Azzam, Osama bin Laden had further direct links to the movement. Whilst studying at King Abdul Ibn Saud University, Osama bin Laden regularly attended the lectures of Mohammed Qutb.¹⁷⁶

220. Alongside his brother, Mohammed Qutb was [accused](#) of plotting to overthrow the government of President Nasser.¹⁷⁷ Although his brother Sayyid Qutb, was subsequently executed for these crimes, Mohammed Qutb was released and sought refuge with other [Muslim Brotherhood members residing in Saudi Arabia](#).¹⁷⁸ Whilst in Saudi Arabia, Mohammed Qutb published and disseminated his brother's works, thereby promoting core values of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.¹⁷⁹

221. It is during his attendance of Mohammed Qutb's weekly lectures, that Osama bin Laden was exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, subsequently becoming [a member of the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood movement](#).¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ Burns, R., "Christianity, Islam, and the West", University Press of America (2011), page 66.

¹⁷⁷ ["Muhammad Qutb passes away in Mecca", Today's Zaman, 4 April 2014.](#)

¹⁷⁸ ["Muhammad Qutb passes away in Mecca", Today's Zaman, 4 April 2014.](#)

¹⁷⁹ Diamond, L. *et al.*, "World Religions and Democracy (A Journal of Democracy Book)", Johns Hopkins UP (2005), page 242.

¹⁸⁰ [Lacroix, S., "Osama bin Laden and the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood, Foreign Policy, 3 October 2012.](#)



4.2.1.4 *Other notable members*

222. As well as the core founders of al-Qa'ida, a number of the network's members were also originally part of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. As a result, throughout its existence, al-Qa'ida has remained aligned with the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood.

223. [Anwar al-Awlaki](#),¹⁸¹ the American-born al-Qa'ida propagandist, had several ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. Whilst preaching in the U.S. between 1994 to 2002, [al-Awlaki often displayed an admiration for Sayyid Qutb](#).¹⁸² Commentators have often described al-Awlaki's position as [being more aligned with those of the Muslim Brotherhood and almost identical to those advocated by Yusuf al-Qaradawi](#),¹⁸³ the Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader. Al-Awlaki subsequently left the U.S. to the U.K. in 2002, where he was supported by organisations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁸⁴ When al-Awlaki had subsequently travelled to Yemen in 2004, he was [protected by](#)

¹⁸¹ [Dodd, V., "Profile: al-Qaida leader Anwar al-Awlaki", The Guardian, 30 September 2011.](#)

¹⁸² [Meleagrou-Hitchens, A., "As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad", International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011.](#)

¹⁸³ [Meleagrou-Hitchens, A., "As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad", International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011.](#)

¹⁸⁴ This includes [IIMAS \(an Arabic acronym which translates as 'the association to revive the way of the messenger\); the Muslim Association of Britain; and the Federation of Student Islamic Societies.](#)



[members of the Muslim Brotherhood](#) so that he could continue to issue statements about the global *jihad*.¹⁸⁵

224. [Khaled Sheikh Mohammed](#) is the Pakistani-born accused of being the mastermind behind the *September 11 attacks*.¹⁸⁶ Having been raised in Kuwait, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed [joined the Muslim Brotherhood at the age of 16](#) prior to his involvement with the al-Qa'ida network.¹⁸⁷

225. [Mohammed Atta](#) is one of the al-Qa'ida hijacker pilots of the planes involved in the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001.¹⁸⁸ In 1990, having completed his architecture studies, Atta joined the [Engineer's Syndicate](#),¹⁸⁹ one of three professional associations controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood.

226. These are just but a few examples of the role the Muslim Brotherhood has played as an ally to al-Qa'ida activities.

¹⁸⁵ [Meleagrou-Hitchens, A., "As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awlaki Became the Face of Western Jihad", International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2011.](#)

¹⁸⁶ ["Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: profiles of accused September 11 plotters", The Telegraph, 5 April 2012.](#)

¹⁸⁷ "Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States", 9/11 Commission, 22 July 2004 available at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>

¹⁸⁸ ["Mohammed Atta", The Biography.](#)

¹⁸⁹ [Lord, J., "Mohammed Atta and the Muslim Brotherhood", The American Spectator.](#)



4.2.2 *Origins of the Islamic State, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab*

227. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“Islamic State”); Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (“Boko Haram”); and Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (“al-Shabaab”) are all off-shoots of the al-Qa’ida network. Bearing in mind the genesis of al-Qa’ida in the Muslim Brotherhood, an indirect link between these three militant groups with the Muslim Brotherhood can therefore be forged.

228. The link between these three militant Islamist groups and the Muslim Brotherhood is further strengthened by the fact that the leaders of Islamic State, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab were first members of the Muslim Brotherhood prior to any link with the al-Qa’ida network. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood has been described as a [gateway of sorts to al-Qa’ida](#).¹⁹⁰

4.2.2.1 *Islamic State*

229. The Islamic State is a predominantly Sunni militant group which has developed against the [backdrop of the civil war in Syria and continuing conflict in Iraq](#).¹⁹¹ The group has been condemned on numerous occasions by the United Nations for its [ongoing barbaric terrorist acts](#),¹⁹² and has been designated as a terrorist organisation by a

¹⁹⁰ [Roggio, B., “Jordanian al Qaeda operative killed in US airstrike in Pakistan”, The Long War Journal, 12 January 2010.](#)

¹⁹¹ [“The Islamic State”, Stanford University, 23 January 2015.](#)

¹⁹² [“Security Council strongly deplores ISIL's 'barbarism,' says resolve stiffened to defeat group”, UN News Centre, 28 February 2015.](#)



number of states, with over [sixty states](#) joining the coalition against it.¹⁹³

230. The roots of the group are found in the [Islamic State of Iraq](#)¹⁹⁴ which in turn was formed by [uniting several groups](#),¹⁹⁵ most notably: (i) al-Qa'ida in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; (ii) the Mujahedeen Shura Council in Iraq; and (iii) Jund al-Sahhaba which translates as Soldiers of the Prophet's Companions.

231. Following the death of Zarqawi in 2006, [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed emir of the Islamic State of Iraq](#).¹⁹⁶ Due to internal disputes with Abu Mohammed al-Golani, leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Baghdadi went on to [encompass Jabhat al-Nusra](#) into the new super-organisation called Islamic State.¹⁹⁷ As recently confirmed by Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated cleric, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the self-appointed *emir* of the Islamic State was [formerly a member of the Muslim Brotherhood](#) prior to joining al-Qa'ida in Iraq.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹³ [House of Lords, Official Report Vol. 755 No. 36, 26 September 2014.](#)

¹⁹⁴ ["What is Islamic State?", BBC News, 26 September 2014.](#)

¹⁹⁵ ["Daesh / Daash Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant \(ISIL\) Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham \(ISIS\) Islamic State in Iraq and Syria \(ISIS\)", GlobalSecurity.org.](#)

¹⁹⁶ [Anjarini, S., "The Evolution of ISIS", Al-Monitor, 1 November 2013.](#)

¹⁹⁷ [Anjarini, S., "The Evolution of ISIS", Al-Monitor, 1 November 2013.](#)

¹⁹⁸ ["Qaradawi: 'Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi used to be with Muslim Brotherhood' uploaded on YouTube, 20 October 2014.](#)



4.2.2.2 *Boko Haram*

232. [Boko Haram¹⁹⁹](#) is a Nigeria-based group which espouses [violent extremist ideology and is closely linked to al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb²⁰⁰](#). It is subject to [UN sanctions²⁰¹](#) and has been designated as a terrorist organisation by a number of states including the [U.S.²⁰²](#) and [U.K.²⁰³](#).

233. The group has deep roots in the social and ethnic divisions in Nigeria and was [established in 2002 in order to impose Islamic sharia across the state²⁰⁴](#), including the predominantly Christian areas in the south. Its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was originally a member of the [Nigerian Muslim Brotherhood²⁰⁵](#).

234. Following his exposure to the Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf went on to experiment with the [Islamic Movement of Nigeria²⁰⁶](#), another militant Islamist group which took inspiration from the works of the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.

¹⁹⁹ ["Boko Haram", Stanford University, 20 February 2015.](#)

²⁰⁰ ["Boko Haram and U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance to Nigeria", US State Dept., 14 May 2014.](#)

²⁰¹ ["Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Boko Haram to Its Sanctions List", UNSC Press Release, 22 May 2014.](#)

²⁰² ["Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru", US State Dept., 13 November 2013.](#)

²⁰³ ["Proscribed Terrorist Organisations", UK Home Office, 23 January 2015.](#)

²⁰⁴ [Aly Sergie, M., and Johnson, T., "Boko Haram", Council on Foreign Relations, 5 March 2015.](#)

²⁰⁵ [Kadivar, M., "The Haram Operations of Boko Haram", Islamic Commentary, 23 May 2014.](#)

²⁰⁶ [Zenn, J., "Nigerian al-Qaedaism", Hudson Institute, 11 March 2014.](#)



4.2.2.3 *Al-Shabaab*

235. [Al-Shabaab](#)²⁰⁷ is a militant group based in Somalia. It is currently subject to [UN sanctions](#)²⁰⁸ and has been designated as a terrorist organisation by a number of states including the [U.S.](#)²⁰⁹ and [U.K.](#)²¹⁰
236. The group was originally [the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council](#) which played a central role in the insurgency which removed Ethiopian forces out of Somalia.²¹¹
237. The group was founded by [Ahmed Abdi Godani in 2006](#).²¹² Prior to this, Godani had been [secretary general of the executive council of the Islamic Courts Union](#),²¹³ a creation of the [Somali Muslim Brotherhood](#).²¹⁴

4.2.3 *Origins of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades*

238. Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (“al-Qassam Brigades”) is the paramilitary wing of the political group, Hamas.

²⁰⁷ [“Al Shabab”, Stanford University, 30 September 2013.](#)

²⁰⁸ [“Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea Adds One Individual to List of Individuals and Entities”, UNSC Press Release, 17 February 2012.](#)

²⁰⁹ [“Designation of al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization”, US State Dept., 26 February 2008.](#)

²¹⁰ [“Proscribed Terrorist Organisations”, UK Home Office, 23 January 2015.](#)

²¹¹ [Cohn, J., “Terrorism Havens: Somalia”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 June 2010.](#)

²¹² [Laing, A., and Flood, Z., “Al-Shabaab: the growing menace of the al-Qaeda affiliate”, The Telegraph, 4 April 2012.](#)

²¹³ [Anzalone, C., “The Life And Death Of Al-Shabab Leader Ahmed Godane”, Combating Terrorism Center, 29 September 2014.](#)

²¹⁴ [Barnes, C. and Hassan, H., “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts”, Chatham House, April 2007.](#)



239. Following the emergence of the state of Israel in 1948, Hassan al-Banna took up the Palestinian cause, which resulted in the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.²¹⁵

240. Prior to establishing Hamas, its founder, Sheik Ahmad Yassin, was active in the [Palestinian branch of Muslim Brotherhood](#).²¹⁶ In his early years Sheikh Yassin had travelled to Al-Azhar University in Cairo during the 1950's during which time he became associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.²¹⁷

241. Sheikh Yassin formed Hamas during the *First Intifada*, a Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation.²¹⁸ He announced the birth of Hamas on 14 December 1987, taking the lead in the Palestinian resistance.²¹⁹ The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood subsequently assumed authorship of Hamas in February 1988. This was followed by the release of the [Hamas Charter](#) on 18 August 1988, which defines Hamas as one of the branches of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Palestine.²²⁰

4.2.4 Sinai Province, formerly Ansar Beit al-Maqdis

²¹⁵ Böwering, G. *et al.*, "The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought", Princeton UP (2012).

²¹⁶ [Laub, Z., "Hamas", Council on Foreign Relations, 1 August 2014.](#)

²¹⁷ Weinberg, L. *et al.*, "Political Parties and Terrorist Groups", Routledge (2008), page 90.

²¹⁸ Weinberg, L. *et al.*, "Political Parties and Terrorist Groups", Routledge (2008), page 91.

²¹⁹ Weinberg, L. *et al.*, "Political Parties and Terrorist Groups", Routledge (2008), page 91.

²²⁰ ["The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement", Yale Law School, 18 August 1988.](#)



242. [Sinai Province](#),²²¹ also known as Wilayat Sinai, is a militant group based in Egypt's Sinai peninsula. Up [until November 2014](#),²²² the group was formerly known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis was declared a terrorist organisation by the [U.S.](#),²²³ [U.K.](#),²²⁴ the [United Arab Emirates](#)²²⁵ and [Egypt](#)²²⁶ in 2014.

243. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis was established in 2011 following the Egyptian revolution in 2011 amid [mass releases and escapes from prison](#).²²⁷ The group [dramatically increased activity](#)²²⁸ following the second revolution that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammad Morsi in July 2013. Prior to this, the group had [primarily targeted Israeli interests](#).²²⁹

244. The timing of the upsurge in the group's attacks against the Egyptian government and security forces implies some association between Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, now Sinai Province, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2013, leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad accused the

²²¹ ["Egypt attack: Profile of Sinai Province militant group", BBC News, 30 January 2015.](#)

²²² [Galal, R., "Security expert: Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis 'gasping for breath", Al-Monitor, 19 November 2014.](#)

²²³ ["Terrorist Designation of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis", US State Dept., 9 April 2014.](#)

²²⁴ ["Proscribed Terrorist Organisations", UK Home Office, 23 January 2015.](#)

²²⁵ ["List of groups designated terrorist organisations by the UAE", The National UAE, 16 November 2014.](#)

²²⁶ Rose, A., "Cairo court officially rules Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis a terrorist organisation", Daily News Egypt, 14 April 2014 available at <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/04/14/cairo-court-officially-rules-ansar-beit-al-maqdis-terrorist-organisation/>

²²⁷ ["Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis's Oath of Allegiance to the Islamic State", WikiStraat, February 2015.](#)

²²⁸ [Colombo, V., "The Muslim Brotherhood and Terrorist Organizations", Gatestone Institute, 6 May 2014.](#)

²²⁹ ["Bombings in Egypt Signal Expanding Militant Capabilities", Stratfor, 24 January 2014.](#)



Muslim Brotherhood [of funding Ansar Beit al-Maqdis](#).²³⁰ Moreover, [Refaat Said](#),²³¹ leader of the Socialist Party in Egypt, went further to state that the Muslim Brotherhood had placed Ansar Beit al-Maqdis in Sinai.

4.3 Shared ideology and values

245. Given that a number of militant Islamist groups are rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood, there are clear ideological parallels between these groups and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Indeed, as previously detailed in this report, the Muslim Brotherhood has played a central role in propounding a number of ideological values which currently form the core of al-Qa'ida; Islamic State; Boko Haram, al-Shabaab; al-Qassam Brigades and Sinai Province.

246. This section will focus on the shared concepts of (i) modern *jahiliyya* and *takfirism*; (ii) a pan-Islamic *caliphate*; and (iii) the Islamic vanguard and global *jiḥād*.

4.3.1 *The Muslim Brotherhood*

247. In order to best analyse the shared ideological values between the Muslim Brotherhood and the various militant Islamist groups, a brief overview of the former's ideological position is set out.

²³⁰ [“Islamic Jihad Founder: Brotherhood has been funding Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis”, Egypt Independent, 9 September 2013.](#)

²³¹ [Colombo, V., “The Muslim Brotherhood and Terrorist Organizations”, Gatestone Institute, 6 May 2014.](#)



248. One of the key pillars of the Muslim Brotherhood movement is the strive against the *jahiliyya*. Literally translated the term *jahiliyya* means the age of ignorance.²³² Traditionally, the term was used to describe the state of ignorance of pre-Islamic Arab states.²³³ This is considered to be a period of lawlessness, barbarism and paganism.²³⁴

249. The concept of *jahiliyya* is therefore considered to be the absence of Islamic belief or guidance. The concept has regained focus in contemporary history and is considered to be central to the thinking of radical components of the Islamic movement of Egypt from 1967 to 1981.²³⁵ This coincides with the publication of Sayyid Qutb's "*Milestones of the Road*" in which the concept of *jahiliyya* formed the core of Qutb's revivalist thought.²³⁶

250. For Qutb, the world had a choice: Islam or *jahiliyya*.²³⁷ Those that do not choose Islam are considered to be *kafirs*, or infidels. This includes Muslims who he considered to have deviated in their practice of Islam holding that carrying out the Islamic rituals, such as pray;

²³² Haddad, Y. *et al.*, "The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography", Greenwood (1991), page 27.

²³³ Haddad, Y. *et al.*, "The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography", Greenwood (1991), page 27.

²³⁴ El-Hammel, C, "Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam", Cambridge UP (2014), page 18.

²³⁵ See Abdelnasser, W., "Islamic Movement In Egypt", Kegan Paul International (1994).

²³⁶ Choueiri, Y., "Islamic Fundamentalism 3rd Edition: The Story of Islamist Movements", Bloomsbury Academic (2010), page 161.

²³⁷ Volpi, F., "Political Islam: A Critical Reader", Routledge (2010), page 275.



charity or fasting, were not enough if Islamic *sharia* was not followed.²³⁸

The concept of *takfirism* is therefore the elimination of any deviation from Islamic *sharia*.

251. Sayyid Qutb's version of modern *jahiliyya* and *takfirism* was a mere extension of Hassan al-Banna's position that the process of [westernization had corrupted Egypt and Muslims across the region](#).²³⁹

252. For al-Banna this indicated a need to revive the political aspects of Islam that had retreated with the decline of the Ottoman empire and the advent of Western colonialism.²⁴⁰ It was this premise that drove al-Banna to form the Muslim Brotherhood and, as discussed below, continues to drive the movement today.

253. The other side of the concept of *jahiliyya* is the establishment of a pan-Islamic *caliphate* and absolute obedience to the Islamic *sharia*. It is this [absolute sovereignty of God which delivers society from jahiliyya](#).²⁴¹

254. The establishment of a pan-Islamic *caliphate* was at the core of Hassan al-Banna's vision for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Banna firmly believed that the Muslim Brotherhood would [aim to](#)

²³⁸ Volpi, F., "Political Islam: A Critical Reader", Routledge (2010), page 274.

²³⁹ ["Muslim Brotherhood", American Foreign Policy Council](#).

²⁴⁰ Spencer, R., "Stealth Jihad: How Radical Islam Is Subverting America without Guns or Bombs", Regnery Publishing (2008), page 14.

²⁴¹ [Cheema, S., "Sayyid Qutb's Concept of Jahiliyya as Metaphor for Modern Society", slam and Muslim Societies, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2006.](#)



stitch together the nascent states that Europe's colonial powers had carved out of the Ottoman empire:²⁴²

“Islam does not recognize geographical boundaries, nor does it acknowledge racial and blood differences, considering all Muslims as one Umma. The Muslim Brethren consider this unity as holy ... [and] believe that the caliphate is a symbol of Islamic Union and ... [see it as] a top priority ...”²⁴³

255. In his *“Milestones of the Road”*, Qutb establishes a four-step process in order to achieve the pan-Islamic *caliphate* and defeat of the *jahiliyya*. This process, known as the Islamic *manhaj*, has as its first step, the development of a community of committed individuals – the vanguard – who would become the leaver for instituting the Islamic state.²⁴⁴

256. For Qutb, the second stage involved the vanguard seizing state power by waging global jihad to both exterminate the rule of *jahiliyya* and to bring about the rule of God known as *hakimiyyat* Allah.²⁴⁵ Qutb advocates that the vanguard must wage jihad on as many fronts in order to establish the final Islamic goal.²⁴⁶

²⁴² “The Arab Spring: A Long March”, *The Economist*, 18 February 2012.

²⁴³ Presented in the fifth general meeting of associations in Cairo, dated 11 October 1938.

²⁴⁴ Cheema, S., “Sayyid Qutb’s Concept of Jahiliyya as Metaphor for Modern Society”, *slam and Muslim Societies*, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2006.

²⁴⁵ Cheema, S., “Sayyid Qutb’s Concept of Jahiliyya as Metaphor for Modern Society”, *slam and Muslim Societies*, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2006.

²⁴⁶ Cheema, S., “Sayyid Qutb’s Concept of Jahiliyya as Metaphor for Modern Society”, *slam and Muslim Societies*, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2006.



257. These ideological principles are not merely historical values. Despite public efforts to [disassociate itself from these values](#),²⁴⁷ the Muslim Brotherhood continues to advocate for the creation of a pan-Islamic *caliphate* which destroys the *jahiliyya*. In 2007, Muslim Brotherhood member of parliament, [Mohammed Shaker Sanar openly admitted that the movement had not changed from its original inception](#):

“The organisation was founded in 1928 to re-establish the Caliphate destroyed by Atatürk...With Allah’s help [the Muslim Brotherhood] will institute the law of Allah.”²⁴⁸

258. Sanar’s position is in line with that of Mohammed Badie, former General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. In December 2012, Badie outlined [six stages](#) for the Muslim Brotherhood movement which included:

- Islamic *sharia* over the individual
- Islamic *sharia* over the family;
- Islamic *sharia* over the society;
- Islamic *sharia* over the government;
- Resurrection of the Caliphate; and
- ‘Mastership of the world.’

²⁴⁷ [Leiken, R. and Brooke, S., “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007.](#)

²⁴⁸ [Zahran, M., ““Islam is Democracy”, What is the Muslim Brotherhood?”, Gatestone Institute, 27 February 2012.](#)



259. The Muslim Brotherhood has not sought to abandon the concept of *jihad* in order to establish 'mastership of the world'. The slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood continues to read: "[Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Koran is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope](#)".²⁴⁹ Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood's publication, "*Risalat al-Ikhwan*", features at the top of its cover the motto: "[jihad is our path; martyrdom is our aspiration](#)".²⁵⁰ Prior to the *September 11 attacks*, this slogan was "our mission: world domination".²⁵¹ Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood's website aspires to the [following ideology](#):

"We want a Muslim individual, a Muslim home, a Muslim people, a Muslim government and state that will lead the Islamic countries and bring into the fold the Muslim Diaspora and the lands robbed from Islam and will then bear the standard of jihad and the call [da'wah] to Allah. [Then the] world will happily accept the precepts of Islam....The problems of conquering the world will only end when the flag of Islam waves and jihad has been proclaimed."²⁵²

260. It is this association with *jihad* which led [Juan Zarate](#), U.S. White House Chief of Counterterrorism, to remark:

²⁴⁹ [Ali, A., "The Quran Is Our Law; Jihad Is Our Way", The Wall Street Journal, 18 February 2011.](#)

²⁵⁰ [Loveluck, L., "Hosni Mubarak and Muslim Brotherhood in court in 'trial of two regimes'", The Telegraph, 25 August 2013.](#)

²⁵¹ See Youssef, M., "Jesus, Jihad and Peace: What Bible Prophecy Says About World Events Today", Worthy Publishing (2015).

²⁵² ["Goals of Muslim Brotherhood", IkhwanOnline.](#)



“The Muslim Brotherhood is a group that worries us not because it deals with philosophical or ideological ideas but because it defends the use of violence against civilians.”²⁵³

261. Efforts to use democracy to establish either support or credibility must be viewed in context. As Sheikh al-Qaradawi explains, the [Muslim Brotherhood democracy “is different”](#)²⁵⁴ given that western democracy does not honour the rule of God. Muslim Brotherhood MP, Mohammed Shaker Sanar further admits that the [Muslim Brotherhood is not committed to Western democratic values](#).²⁵⁵

262. This was echoed by Mohammed Mahdi Akef, a former General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, who unequivocally stated in 2005 that the Muslim Brotherhood opposed U.S. democracy stating that it was [“corrupt and serves the American agenda”](#) and that U.S. democracy [“wants to destroy the \[Islamic\] nation, its faith and tradition”](#).²⁵⁶

263. More telling is the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood views its involvement in Western-style democracy as an alternative form of *jihad*

²⁵³ Guitta, O., “Muslim Brotherhood Parties in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region”, Centre for European Studies, September 2010.

²⁵⁴ Mauro, R., “The Islamist Plan for Victory: ‘Gradualism’”, FamilySecurityMatters, 17 January 2012.

²⁵⁵ Halevi, J., “Where is The Muslim Brotherhood Headed?”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 20 June 2012.

²⁵⁶ Borchgrave, A., “Muslim Brotherhood Objective: Global Islamic State”, NewsMax, 22 February 2011.



to destroy the *jahliyya*. As disclosed during the U.S. federal court trial of the Holy Land Foundation, members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S are compelled to “[understand that their work in America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within.](#)”²⁵⁷

264. Similar sentiments have been echoed by Mohammed Badie who had described the U.S. as an infidel nation that “[does not champion moral and human values and cannot lead humanity.](#)”²⁵⁸ Badie has gone on to characterize both the U.S. and Israel as “the Muslim’s real enemies” asserting that “[waging jihad against both of these infidels is a commandment of Allah that cannot be disregarded](#)”.²⁵⁹ Tellingly, Badie maintains that the “[change that the \[Muslim\] nation seeks can only be attained through jihad and sacrifice and by raising a jihadi generation that pursues death just as the enemies pursue life.](#)”²⁶⁰

265. Badie’s comments have found theological support from Yusuf al-Qaradawi who has issued a number of fatwas waging *jihad* against Western governments who seek to control Islamic countries. In 1998, al-Qaradawi held “[there should be no dialogue with these people](#)

²⁵⁷ [“The Muslim Brotherhood’s Strategic Plan For America - Court Document”, Clarion Project, 2013.](#)

²⁵⁸ [“The Muslim Brotherhood: On the Record”, Washington Institute, 4 February 2011.](#)

²⁵⁹ [Mauro, R., “White House Label of Brotherhood as Non-Violent Patently False”, Clarion Project, 3 December 2014.](#)

²⁶⁰ [Goldberg, J., “What the Muslim Brotherhood Stands For”, The Atlantic, 31 January 2011.](#)



[\[Israelis\] except with swords](#)".²⁶¹ In 2004, al-Qaradawi issued a *fatwa* endorsing the [killing of U.S. soldiers](#).²⁶²

266. The Muslim Brotherhood also continues to advocate the concept of *takfirism*. Yusuf al-Qaradawi has issued a number of *fatwas* which [supports the harsh treatment of those who apostatize from Islam](#).²⁶³ This apostate, said al-Qaradawi in a June 2002 *fatwa*, "[is no more than a traitor to his religion and his people and thus deserves killing](#)".²⁶⁴

267. Similar rhetoric and conduct of the various militant Islamist groups reflect the words of both the Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide, Mohammed Badie, and its international and spiritual figurehead, Yusuf al-Qaradawi.

4.3.2 *Al-Qassam Brigades*

268. Al-Qassam Brigades were created as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore the ideology of the al-Qassam Brigades is identical to that of the Muslim Brotherhood encompassing the concept of *jahiliyya*; *jihad* and the establishment of a pan-Islamic *caliphate*.

²⁶¹ Ahlert, A., "Obama's Genocidal Mediator", FrontPageMag, 3 January 2012 available at <http://www.frontpagemag.com/2012/arnold-ahlert/a-radical-islamist-sheikh-surrenders-on-behalf-of-america/>

²⁶² [Kredo, A., "Muslim cleric who backed fatwa on 'killing of U.S. soldiers' promoted by State Dept.", The Washington Times, 24 May 2014.](#)

²⁶³ ["Yusuf al-Qaradawi", Investigative Project on Terrorism, 9 July 2008.](#)

²⁶⁴ ["Fatwa", IslamOnline, 24 June 2002.](#)



269. Al-Qassam Brigades are actually named after Izz a-din al-Qassam, one of the initial members of the Muslim Brotherhood alongside Hassan al-Banna. Having been killed in battle in Palestine in 1935 by British forces, Izz a-din al-Qassam is considered by the Muslim Brotherhood to be their first martyr in the *jihād* against the West.²⁶⁵

4.3.3 *Al-Qa'ida*

270. According to U.S. authorities, al-Qa'ida's strategic objectives are to [remove Western influence and presence from the Muslim world, topple "apostate" government of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate governed by its own interpretation of Islamic sharia](#) that ultimately would be at the centre of a new international order.²⁶⁶

271. As with the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qa'ida has also targeted the values of both the U.S. and Israel. In August 1996, al-Qa'ida issued its first *fatwa* entitled "[Declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places](#)",²⁶⁷ signed by Osama bin Laden, and urged would-be jihadists "[to take part in fighting against the enemy - your enemy and their enemy - the Americans and the Israelis](#)."²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ Patterson, D., "A Genealogy of Evil: Anti-Semitism from Nazism to Islamic Jihad", Cambridge UP (2010), page 110.

²⁶⁶ ["Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations", US State Dept., 31 July 2012.](#)

²⁶⁷ ["Declaration of War by Osama bin Laden, 1996", Council on Foreign Relations, August 1996.](#)

²⁶⁸ ["Bin Laden's Fatwa", PBS Newshour, 23 August 1996.](#)



272. Similarly the [second fatwa, published on 23 February 1998](#) and signed by *inter alia*, Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, ordered all Muslims to:

“[K]ill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it [...] [E]very Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.”²⁶⁹

273. Although the Western enemy has extended to other states including [France](#),²⁷⁰ the ideological values of al-Qa’ida have remained the same since the issuance of both *fatwas* and are a constant in all branches of the network.²⁷¹

274. The origins of al-Qa’ida’s ideology stems from the works of Abdallah Azzam, who is discussed earlier in this chapter. In April 1988, mere months before he assisted in the establishment of al-Qa’ida, Azzam published an article entitled “*Al-Qa’id Al-Sulbah*” which translates as “*The Solid Base*”. In this article, [Azzam echoes the need for](#)

²⁶⁹ [“Nass Bayan al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah al-Alamiyah li-Jihad al-Yahud wa-al-Salibiyyin”, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 23 February 1998.](#)

²⁷⁰ [“Yemeni Al-Qaeda says France replaced US as ‘main enemy of Islam’”, Russia Today, 31 January 2015.](#)

²⁷¹ Namely, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida in Iraq; and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. More recently, the network has established al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent.



[an Islamist vanguard as proffered by Sayyid Qutb](#),²⁷² in order to enforce the rule of God. At the time of publication, Azzam was of the belief that the [U.S was intent on robbing jihadis of their victory](#)²⁷³ over the Soviets by imposing secularist interests on Afghanistan. Azzam called for the [long jihad in order to defeat secularist values and to resurrect the pan-Islamic caliphate](#):

“To continue the jihad no matter how long the road is, until the last breath will be taken, or the last vein will throb, or until we will see the State of Islam standing on its feet.”²⁷⁴

275. This was to lead to the creation of the al-Qa’ida network, with bin Laden subsequently declaring in 2001 the need to “[redraw the map of the Islamic world to become one state under the banner of the caliphate](#).”²⁷⁵ In this same declaration, bin Laden confirms the [necessity of creating a vanguard to carry out jihad](#).²⁷⁶

276. Although Azzam died within the first year of al-Qa’ida’s inception, the same values continued to be upheld with al-Qa’ida ensuring its message was (and remains today) clear to the world.

²⁷² [Gunaratna, R., “Al-Qaeda’s Ideology”, Hudson Institute, 19 May 2005.](#)

²⁷³ [Smith, M., “Al-Qa’ida Al-Subah: The Solid Base”, Inside the Jihad, 10 March 2014.](#)

²⁷⁴ [Smith, M., “Al-Qaida Al-Subah: The Solid Base”, Kronos, 2 March 2014.](#)

²⁷⁵ [Joscelyn, T., “Analysis: Al-Qaeda attempts to undermine new Islamic State with old video of Bin Laden”, The Long War Journal, 15 July 2014.](#)

²⁷⁶ [Joscelyn, T., “Analysis: Al-Qaeda attempts to undermine new Islamic State with old video of Bin Laden”, The Long War Journal, 15 July 2014.](#)



277. The ideology of the al-Qa'ida network has largely been developed by Ayman Zawahiri, with bin Laden providing the front and the finance for al-Qa'ida.

278. Zawahiri, who was discussed earlier in this chapter, is a staunch advocate of Qutb, declaring that the al-Qa'ida campaign [started on the death of Qutb in 1966](#).²⁷⁷ In his book *"Fursan Taht Rayah al-Nabi"*, or *"Knights under the Prophet's Banner"*, Zawahiri highlighted the importance of Qutb's works finding that Sayyid Qutb's ideology had sowed the seeds for an Islamic revolution [which justified the use of violence, externally as well as internally](#).²⁷⁸

279. The original strands of Zawahiri's ideology for the network can be found in his publication entitled *"Shifa' Sudur Al-Mu'minin"* translated as *"The Cure for Believers' Hearts"*. Zawahiri published this article in 1996 around the same time as bin Laden's first *fatwa*, within which he set out the logistical requirements for global *jihad*. The article set out the justification for global *jihad* which targeted the West and apostate Arab regimes.²⁷⁹

280. These values have since been replicated in the extensive books and essays published by the network as part of its propaganda

²⁷⁷ ["All You Need To Know About The New Al Qaeda Chief, Ayman Al-Zawahiri"](#), Richard Whelan, 28 June 2011.

²⁷⁸ ["Profile of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's Heir as Leader of Al-Qaeda"](#), The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 19 June 2011.

²⁷⁹ See Bakker, E., and Boer, L., *"The Evolution of Al-Qaedaism: Ideology, Terrorist, and Appeal"*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations (2007).



campaign to appeal to the masses. This includes, for example, Zawahiri's essay entitled "*Al Wala Wal Bara*" which translates as "*Loyalty and Enmity*". This 2002 publication sets out al-Qa'ida's position that the [world is divided into two warring camps: true Muslims and the rest of the world](#),²⁸⁰ thereby echoing the position propounded by Sayyid Qutb and reinforcing al-Qa'ida's position as a *takfiri* organisation.

281. There are clear similarities between the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qa'ida, which is to be expected given the origins of the latter. However, despite this, efforts have been made by both groups to disassociate from the other.

282. For example, in the 1991 publication entitled "*Al-Hissad Al-Murr*", or the "*The Bitter Harvest*", Zawahiri criticized the Muslim Brotherhood for what he [perceived as inactivity](#):

"[The Muslim Brotherhood] takes advantage of the Muslim youths' fervour by bringing them into the fold only to store them in a refrigerator. Then, they steer their onetime passionate, Islamic zeal for *jihad* to conferences and elections.... And not only have the Brothers been idle from fulfilling their duty of fighting to the death, but they have gone as far as to describe the infidel governments as legitimate, and have joined ranks with

²⁸⁰ [Quiggin, T., "Understanding al-Qaeda's Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work", Terrorism Research Initiative Vol. 3 No. 2, 2009.](#)



them in the ignorant style of governing, that is, democracies, elections, and parliaments.”²⁸¹

283. Zawahiri continued to criticize the Muslim Brotherhood on the same basis in later years.²⁸² Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood, along with other Islamic leaders, did [criticize Al-Qa’ida](#) for its large scale attack on U.S. soil during the September 11 attacks.²⁸³

284. From this, [commentators](#)²⁸⁴ have referred to the fact that whilst al-Qa’ida favours an implacable jihad to destroy the economies of the Western countries, the Muslim Brotherhood supports jihad against foreign presence in the Islamic world with its main priority being the construction of a Muslim infrastructure to usurp the Western governments.

285. However, even if it is conceded that the two groups employ different tactics or tools, the ultimate policy and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qa’ida remain the same- that is the use and promotion of violence to achieve the creation of a pan-Islamic *caliphate*.

²⁸¹ [Ibrahim, I., “Ayman Zawahiri and Egypt: A Trip Through Time”, IPT News, 30 November 2012.](#)

²⁸² See [Leikan, R. and Brooke, S., “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, Foreign Policy \(2007\):](#) “Al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at [the Muslim Brotherhood] for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for elections ... instead of into the lines of jihad”.

²⁸³ [Mauro, R., “White House Label of Brotherhood as Non-Violent Patently False”, Clarion Project, 3 December 2014.](#)

²⁸⁴ [“U.S. Army War College Professor Says Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas are Moderates”, FamilySecurityMatters, 17 January 2009.](#)



286. The similarities in ideology have been recognised by both groups on numerous occasion, not least by [Osama bin Laden](#):

“[C]urrent conditions have brought unprecedented opportunities and the coming of Islamic governments that follow the fundamental doctrine is a benefit to Islam [...] [T]here is a sizeable direction within the Muslim Brotherhood that holds the fundamental doctrine, so the return of the Brothers and those like them to the true Islam is a matter of time.”²⁸⁵

4.3.4 *Islamic State*

287. The similarities in shared ideologies between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic State has led to members of the U.S congress to conclude that the “[\[Islamic State\] emerged from the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood](#)”.²⁸⁶

288. Since its inception, the Islamic State has ultimately sought to establish an Islamic *caliphate* based on its interpretation of Islam and Islamic *sharia*. Consistent with its jargon, the Islamic State is of the belief that this *caliphate* has been obtained [as announced by its emir](#), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi:

²⁸⁵ [Joscelyn, T., “Osama bin Laden on the Muslim Brotherhood”, The Long War Journal, 10 May 2012.](#)

²⁸⁶ [Hussain, G., “Iraq crisis: What does the Isis caliphate mean for global jihadism?”, The Independent, 30 June 2014.](#)



“Muslims everywhere [...] you have a state and calipha, which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership.”²⁸⁷

289. In order to achieve the restored *caliphate*, al-Baghdadi has adopted the call to act against foreign domination of the Arab world, in line with the calls of the forefathers of the Muslim Brotherhood. This includes the use of *jihad* against [Western targets within the Middle East](#),²⁸⁸ and more recently, [attacks within Europe](#).²⁸⁹

290. As well as waging *jihad* against Western domination, the [majority of the Islamic State's targets are Muslims](#).²⁹⁰ Following the *takfiri* doctrine sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic State is committed to what it perceives as [purifying the region of Muslim apostates](#).²⁹¹

291. Although the perception of the Islamic State is far more barbaric and intolerable than the image of the Muslim Brotherhood, in its basic form the Islamic State differs little from the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamic State aims to be a [deeply ideological closed vanguard which](#)

²⁸⁷ [Strange, H., “Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi addresses Muslims in Mosul”, The Telegraph, 5 July 2014.](#)

²⁸⁸ [Moore, J., “ISIS Attack on Tripoli Hotel Opens New Front Against West”, Newsweek, 27 January 2015.](#)

²⁸⁹ [Malik, S. et al., “Paris supermarket attacker claims allegiance to Islamic State in video”, the Guardian, 11 January 2015.](#) See also [“ISIS sets up English-speaking brigade to target Western countries”, Russia Today \(2015\).](#)

²⁹⁰ [Safi, M., “Jihadi attacks - the data behind November's 5,000 deaths”, The Guardian, 11 December 2014.](#)

²⁹¹ [Wood, G., “What ISIS Really Wants”, The Atlantic, March 2015.](#)



[promotes Islam as an all-encompassing aspect of daily society](#).²⁹² This is no different to the values promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood both at inception and in present day. [Gomaa Amin, a late senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood, reiterated Hassan al-Banna's core principle providing:](#)

"Islam is in need of a state and authority. One of its most important roles is protecting the [Islamic nation's] creed that today is mocked, in addition to establishing its rituals and observances until it governs all [aspects] of life."²⁹³

292. This rhetoric has attracted remarks concerning the similarities of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic State as being "[virtually two sides of the same coin](#)".²⁹⁴

4.3.5 Sinai Province, formerly Ansar Beit al-Maqdis

293. Sinai Province's slogan, as established by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, references the same Quranic verse singled out by Hassan al-Banna: "[Fight them until there is no fitnah \[discord\], and \[until\] the religion, all of it, is for Allah](#)".²⁹⁵

²⁹² [Trager, E. and Barnhard, G., "Brothers in Trouble? Gomaa Amin and the Future of the Muslim Brotherhood" Council on Foreign Relations, 24 September 2014.](#)

²⁹³ [Trager, E. and Barnhard, G., "Brothers in Trouble? Gomaa Amin and the Future of the Muslim Brotherhood" Council on Foreign Relations, 24 September 2014.](#)

²⁹⁴ [Mitra, D., "Muslim Brotherhood courts ISIS for support", Times of Oman, 18 October 2014.](#)

²⁹⁵ [Colombo, V., "The Muslim Brotherhood and Terrorist Organizations", Gatestone Institute, 6 May 2014.](#)



294. [The group has declared its aim](#) to:

“liberate [the] Ummah and Muslim people from the slavery of the oppressive, apostate regimes, and establish justice, dignity and freedom for them, and that is only through servitude to Allah alone and implementing His proper Shariah.”²⁹⁶

295. As with the ideological position of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sinai Province has invoked *jihad* in order to implement Islamic *sharia* in all aspects of Egyptian daily life. In a rallying statement in 2014, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis [repeated a call to rise up against Egypt’s military-backed government](#), stating:

“To our people in Egypt, what are you waiting for after the violation of your dignity? After shedding the blood of your sons on the hands of this reckless tyrant and his soldiers? When will you take out your swords to face your enemies?”²⁹⁷

296. The group has subsequently engaged in a number of violent terrorist attacks against [Egyptian security forces and politicians](#).²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ [Barnett, D., “Ansar Jerusalem claims credit for suicide bombing of South Sinai Security Directorate”, The Long War Journal, 9 October 2013.](#)

²⁹⁷ [Kirkpatrick, D., “Militant Group in Egypt Vows Loyalty to ISIS”, New York Times, 10 November 2014.](#)

²⁹⁸ [Kirkpatrick, D., “Militant Group in Egypt Vows Loyalty to ISIS”, New York Times, 10 November 2014.](#)



297. During its initial stages, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis had primarily targeted Israeli interests thereby [aligning its position with al-Qassam Brigades](#),²⁹⁹ the Palestinian affiliated branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. More recently, the group [pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State](#),³⁰⁰ thereby triggering the name change to Sinai Province. Much like the Muslim Brotherhood, the group was directed by its desire for a pan-Islamic *caliphate*, [chastising those who had not already joined the Islamic State](#):

“To what are you aspiring? A state has been established for Islam and Muslims, and a Caliph was appointed for them... yet you slacken through your failure to support it.”³⁰¹

4.3.6 *Boko Haram*

298. The term ‘Boko Haram’ translates as “[Western education is a sin](#)”³⁰² in the regional Hausa language. Moreover, the group’s official Arabic name, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad, refers to adherents of [proselytism and holy war](#).³⁰³

²⁹⁹ Yaari, E., “The New Triangle of Egypt, Israel, and Hamas”, Washington Institute, 17 January 2014.

³⁰⁰ Bassiouni, M., “Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis joins Islamic State”, Al-Monitor, 13 November 2014.

³⁰¹ Joscelyn, T., “Sinai-based jihadists pledge allegiance to Islamic State in audio recording”, The Long War Journal, 10 November 2014.

³⁰² “Who, What, Why: Exactly what does the phrase Boko Haram mean?”, BBC News, 13 May 2014.

³⁰³ Lichter, L., “Boko Haram's Ideology Key to Violence”, Huffington Post, 16 May 2014.



299. The group has justified violent acts of terror as part of its propaganda rejecting Western values which it deems as *haram* or sinful as it seeks to suppress Islam. For example, following the abduction of nearly 300 schoolgirls from a school in Chibok, Borno State in 2014, Boko Haram's leader [cited to ideological opposition to the Western education of young girls](#).³⁰⁴

300. In particular, echoing the Muslim Brotherhood, Boko Haram has specifically rejected Western democracy, [waging jihad to end Western dominance in the Islamic world](#):

"These European educated Muslims returned home only to confuse other Muslims, claiming that democracy is comparable with Islam, while Jihad should only be for self-control ... We are for jihad, and our jihad is to put an end to democracy, to western education and western civilization. The Jihad is intended to make us [Muslims] return to the original state of Islam."³⁰⁵

301. As part of its *jihad*, Boko Haram has both a regional priority and an international aspect. With regard to the latter, the group has issued a number of statements warning the U.S. that ["jihad has just begun"](#),³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ ["Terrorism in Africa and the Recent Attacks of Boko Haram", Homeland Security Digital Library, 13 May 2014.](#)

³⁰⁵ [Zenn, J., "Nigerian al-Qaedaism", Hudson Institute, 1 March 2014.](#)

³⁰⁶ [Joscelyn, T., "UN adds Boko Haram to al Qaeda sanctions", The Long War Journal, 23 May 2014.](#)



[claiming responsibility for a number of attacks against Westerners in Africa.](#)³⁰⁷

302. With regard to its domestic ideology, Boko Haram has sought to target local targets, including the [Nigerian government](#),³⁰⁸ which it perceives as a mere extension of Western civilization. In doing so, Boko Haram does not differentiate between non-Muslims and Muslims. It is a *takfiri* organisation which accuses all other groups of being apostates.

303. Boko Haram's waging of *jihad* is consistent with the objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood, namely to impose Islamic *sharia* and establish a pan-Islamic *caliphate* in Northern Africa. Yusuf, and subsequently the current leader, Abubaker Shekau, have stated that [no reconciliation could be met with the Nigerian government until Islamic sharia is the law of the land.](#)³⁰⁹

304. Boko Haram perceives itself as part of the Islamic vanguard described by the forefathers of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, the group refuses to deviate from the ideological doctrines propounded by the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2009, Mohammed Yusuf expressly stated that ["\[a\]ll Islamic scholars who undermine Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna and Osama bin Laden are not authentic Islamic scholars"](#).³¹⁰

³⁰⁷ ["Boko Haram Recent Attacks", START, May 2014.](#)

³⁰⁸ [Chothia, F., "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?", BBC News, 21 January 2015.](#)

³⁰⁹ [Zenn, J., "Nigerian al-Qaedaism", Hudson Institute, 1 March 2014.](#)

³¹⁰ [Zenn, J., "Nigerian al-Qaedaism", Hudson Institute, 1 March 2014.](#)



305. In keeping with the present version of this vanguard, [Boko Haram swore allegiance to the Islamic State](#),³¹¹ having previously aligned itself with [al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb](#).³¹² The group offered the areas under its control in the Borno state to be part of the pan-Islamic *caliphate*.

306. In doing so, Boko Haram has brought itself in line with other militant Islamist groups which share the same ideologies as the Muslim Brotherhood.

4.3.7 *Al-Shabaab*

307. Al-Shabaab's primary objective is the [establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia](#),³¹³ based on Islamic law known as *sharia* and the [elimination of foreign 'infidel' influence](#).³¹⁴ In doing so, former al-Shabaab spokesperson, Abu-Mansoor al-Amriki reiterated the need to establish Islamic *sharia*, citing as an inspiration Sayyid Qutb who al-Amriki states, "[refused to accept entering into the *kaafir* \[infidel\] governments as a solution](#)."³¹⁵

308. Al-Shabaab has also followed the Muslim Brotherhood's suit in its support for the *takfiri* doctrine. This is emphasised by Sheik

³¹¹ [Boffey, D., "Boko Haram declares allegiance to Islamic State", The Guardian, 8 March 2015.](#)

³¹² [Blair, D., "Al-Qaeda's hand in Boko Haram's deadly Nigerian attacks", The Telegraph, 5 February 2012.](#)

³¹³ [Master, J. and Sergie, M., "Al-Shabaab", Council on Foreign Relations, 13 March 2015.](#)

³¹⁴ ["Al-Shabaab \(Al-Shabab\) The Supreme Islamic Courts Union \(ICU\)", GlobalSecurity.org.](#)

³¹⁵ [Gartenstein-Ross, D., "The Strategic Challenge of Somalia's Al-Shabaab", Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2009 Vol. 16 No. 4, 2009.](#)



Mukhtar Robow, another spokesperson for the group, who emphasised the importance of complying with Islamic law and the fact that punishment for not complying with Islamic *sharia* would be meted out to anyone, including those engaged in *jihād*.³¹⁶ During his announcement, Robow referred to the execution of one jihadist in the area of Wajid in Somalia as an example.³¹⁷

309. To enforce Islamic *sharia*, al-Shabaab has fully endorsed the global *jihād* vision. It has participated in a range of attacks against Western targets [across East Africa in the name of jihād](#).³¹⁸ More recently, the group has made a specific target of the U.S. [calling for attacks on shopping areas in the U.S.](#)³¹⁹

310. In early 2008, when the U.S. designated al-Shabaab a global terrorist entity, prominent members of the group struck a celebratory tone. Robow told the BBC that he welcomed the [designation as an honor](#) because “[w]e are good Muslims and the Americans are infidels. We are on the right path.”³²⁰

311. In particular al-Shabaab has shunned Western democracy for the same reasons cited by Muslim Brotherhood leaders. In an audio message on January 2009, the group's emir Sheikh Mukhtar

³¹⁶ See Shay, S., “Somalia in Transition since 2006”, Transaction Publishers (2014).

³¹⁷ See Shay, S., “Somalia in Transition since 2006”, Transaction Publishers (2014).

³¹⁸ [“Al-Shabaab \(Al-Shabab\) The Supreme Islamic Courts Union \(ICU\)”, GlobalSecurity.org.](#)

³¹⁹ [Swaine, J., “Al-Shabaab mall threat 'all the more reason' to avoid shutdown, says homeland security chief”, The Guardian, 22 February 2015.](#)

³²⁰ [Harper, M., “Profile: Somalia’s Islamist ‘lads’”, BBC News website, 21 March 2008.](#)



Abdirahman Abu Zubeyr said that democracy and communism had failed in Somalia because both political systems “were incongruent with the teachings of the Islamic religion.”³²¹

312. Al-Shabaab does not view its efforts in isolation but as furthering the global *jihad* ideology as evoked by al-Qa’ida and established by the Muslim Brotherhood.³²²

313. Al-Shabaab’s overarching objective is to establish, through *jihad*, an [‘Islamic Emirate of Somalia’](#),³²³ to include Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, north-eastern Kenya, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Djibouti. The group believes that this will assist in the grand creation of a pan-Islamic *caliphate*.

4.4 Muslim Brotherhood support for militant Islamist groups

314. Despite recent efforts to be portrayed as a moderate political party, the Muslim Brotherhood continues to [demonstrate allegiance to militant Islamist groups](#) with its provision of political and financial support.³²⁴

³²¹ See Shay, S., “Somalia in Transition since 2006”, Transaction Publishers (2014).

³²² [Al-Shabaab swore allegiance to al-Qa’ida in 2012.](#)

³²³ [“Al-Shabaab \(Al-Shabab\) The Supreme Islamic Courts Union \(ICU\)”, GlobalSecurity.org.](#)

³²⁴ [Gilligan, A., “How the Muslim Brotherhood fits into a network of extremism”, The Telegraph, 8 February 2015.](#)



4.4.1 Political support

315. In 2007, “*Foreign Affairs*” magazine published an article entitled [*The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood*](#) authored by Robert S. Leikan and Steven Brooks.³²⁵ The article sought to separate the Muslim Brotherhood from militant Islamist groups submitting that the group rejects global *jihad*, embraces democracy and is willing to engage with the U.S.

316. However, at the same time, members of the Muslim Brotherhood have provided public support for violent acts of terrorism undertaken by militant Islamist groups.

317. This support has been displayed by various high-ranking members of the Muslim Brotherhood including former General Guide Muhammed Mahdi Akef, as mentioned in Chapter 3. In 2004, Akef expressed public support for the suicide bombings in Israel and Iraq, during the Iraq war, “in order to expel the Zionists and the Americans”.³²⁶

318. Similar rhetoric has been echoed during parliament sessions by Muslim Brotherhood MP Rajab Hilal Hamida. Writing in the daily Egyptian publication, “*Roz al-Youssef*”, [Hamida stated](#):

³²⁵ [Leiken, R. and Brooke, S., “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2007.](#)

³²⁶ See Pargeter, A., “The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power”, Saqi Books (2013), page 9, 20.



“Terrorism is not a curse when given its true meaning [...] From my point of view, bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and al-Zaraqawi are not terrorists in the sense accepted by some. I support all their activities since they are a thorn in the side of the Americans and the Zionists.”³²⁷

319. The Muslim Brotherhood’s support for militant Islamist groups continues today. Commentators have taken note of the fact that recently deceased high-profile member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Gomaa Amin, [highlighted the severe anti-Westernism](#), which both the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic State embrace.³²⁸

320. Support for the Islamic State has also come from prominent Muslim Brotherhood member, Wagdy Ghoneim, who publically announced his condemnation of air strikes on Islamic State targets and called for [unity in the face of the Crusader allegiance against Muslims](#).³²⁹ In particular, Ghoneim urged Muslims to “not crusade against the Islamic State” adding that he was “[with \[his\] brothers in ISIL \[Islamic State\] in some matters](#)” and that he “[rejects the Crusader alliance to defeat them](#)”.³³⁰ In his support for the Islamic State, [Ghoneim also extended his support to al-Qa’ida](#) stating:

³²⁷ [Khalil, L., “Al-Qaeda & the Muslim Brotherhood: United by Strategy, Divided by Tactics”, Terrorism Monitor Vol. 4 Issue. 6, 23 March 2006.](#)

³²⁸ [Trager, E. and Barnhard, G., “Brothers in Trouble? Gomaa Amin and the Future of the Muslim Brotherhood” Council on Foreign Relations, 24 September 2014.](#)

³²⁹ [Mauro, R., “Islamists Featured at Countering Violent Extremism Summit”, Clarion Project, 24 February 2015.](#)

³³⁰ [Hassan, B., “Wagdy Ghoneim announces support for Daesh after being expelled from Qatar”, Al-Masry Al-Youm, 16 September 2014.](#)



“America is the largest terrorist state, and the West, too. We will not forget what it did to America’s Indians, and the Abu Ghraib prison, Allah is sufficient for me, the most excellent in whom I trust, and yes, America the body of the martyr bin Laden into the sea [...].”³³¹

321. Ghoneim’s comments are consistent with the Muslim Brotherhood’s [constant support for the rebel groups opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad](#),³³² from which the Islamic State has gained strength.

322. More recently, senior officials in the Islamic Action Party, the political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, [called for support of the Islamic State and condemned Western air strikes in Syria and Iraq](#).³³³ The current leader of the Jordanian branch went as far as to [call on the Jordanian government to withdraw from the international coalition against the Islamic State](#).³³⁴

323. Despite a huge showing of national unity in Jordan following the murder of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasaesbeh by the Islamic State, the [Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood refuses to join other Jordanians in](#)

³³¹ [Hassan, B., “Wagdy Ghoneim announces support for Daesh after being expelled from Qatar”, Al-Masry Al-Youm, 16 September 2014.](#)

³³² [Sly, L., “Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood is gaining influence over anti-Assad revolt”, The Washington Post, 12 May 2012.](#)

³³³ [“Jordanian Brothers call for support to stand by Daesh”, Al-Arab, 23 October 2014.](#)

³³⁴ [Himelfarb, J., “Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood Won’t Condemn ISIS’ Murder of Pilot”, NewsMax, 10 February 2015.](#)



[standing against the militant Islamist group](#).³³⁵ This lack of condemnation is as powerful as any positive support for the violent acts carried out by the Islamic State.

324. Similarly, following the [beheading of twenty-one Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya by the Islamic State](#),³³⁶ the Muslim Brotherhood failed to condemn the barbaric attack. Instead, Muslim Brotherhood leaders penned an open letter to [U.S. President Barack Obama requesting he denounce retaliatory airstrikes by Egypt on Islamic State targets in Libya](#).³³⁷

325. It is evident from the above that support for the Islamic State is widespread amongst members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In June 2014, a statement published on the Muslim Brotherhood website drew strong criticism for its implied condemnation of the Islamic State. The published statement made no explicit reference to the Islamic State, instead stating, “the blood and honour of Muslims are prohibited by Muslims [...]”. Following angry comments from its members, the Muslim Brotherhood launched an [internal investigation to review how the statement was published on the site](#).³³⁸ The Muslim Brotherhood was quick to abandon any attempt to condemn the Islamic State and

³³⁵ [Himelfarb, J., “Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood Won't Condemn ISIS' Murder of Pilot”, NewsMax, 10 February 2015.](#)

³³⁶ [“ISIS video appears to show beheadings of Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya”, CNN News, 16 February 2015.](#)

³³⁷ [Abdel Azim, N., “MB urges Obama to abandon Egypt's proposal for Libya”, Al-Bawaba News, 20 February 2015.](#)

³³⁸ [“Egyptian Islamists Respond to ISIS' Declaration of the 'Caliphate'”, Arab West Report, 3 August 2014.](#)



has since failed to issue any similar statement against the militant Islamist group.

326. The Islamic State is not the only militant Islamist group which is supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. Former leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni, has [repeatedly pledged support for violent acts undertaken by al-Qassam Brigades](#).³³⁹

327. In certain circumstances, the Muslim Brotherhood has gone beyond vocal support for militant Islamist groups in order to receive much-needed assistance from such groups.

328. During the June 2013 revolution in Egypt, Mohammed Morsi, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood and at the time President of Egypt, contacted Mohammed Zawahiri, brother of al-Qa'ida leader Ayman Zawahiri. [Recently disclosed intercepts of the call on 30 June 2013](#)³⁴⁰ reveal Morsi inciting Zawahiri to rise against the Egyptian military in Sinai and requesting Zawahiri to compel all *jihadi* elements to come to the aid of the Muslim Brotherhood.

329. In response Mohammed Zawahiri reportedly stated that he would ["fight the \[Egyptian\] military and the police, and we will set the Sinai aflame"](#).³⁴¹

³³⁹ ["Muslim Brotherhood", Almanac](#).

³⁴⁰ [Mohammed, K., "Publish the 5 intercepts between Morsi and Zawahiri", Al-Watan News, 22 November 2013.](#)

³⁴¹ [Schachtel, J., "State Dept: Muslim Brotherhood Us Trip 'Organized And Funded' By Georgetown University", Breitbart, 30 January 2015.](#)



330. Mohammed Morsi also reached out to Ayman Zawahiri, appealing to the al-Qai'da leader to send [3,000 Islamist volunteers to fight Egyptian government forces in the Sinai Peninsula](#).³⁴² Ayman Zawahiri in turn [condemned the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood](#), and urged al-Qa'ida followers to conduct kidnappings of westerners in Egypt.³⁴³

331. The solidarity between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Zawahiri brothers follows a prior agreement in which the Egyptian authorities under [Morsi's leadership released a number of convicted militant Islamists in 2012](#).³⁴⁴ This included Mohammed Zawahiri who at the time was detained for his [alleged involvement in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981](#).³⁴⁵ Following Zawahiri's release, as ordered by the Muslim Brotherhood-led government at the time, [it was agreed that al-Qa'ida would support the Muslim Brotherhood, including all its international branches, on the understanding that Morsi would seek to implement full Islamic sharia](#)

³⁴² [Hatita, A., "Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda planned attacks in Egypt: report", Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 14 February 2015.](#)

³⁴³ Koppeser, A. and Abdallah, A., "Al Qaeda chief declares solidarity with Muslim Brotherhood, urges followers to kidnap westerners", Daily News Egypt, 27 April 2014 available at <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/04/27/al-qaeda-chief-declares-solidarity-muslim-brotherhood-urges-followers-kidnap-westerners/>

³⁴⁴ ["Morsi's links to jihadists probed: AP", Ahram Online, 3 December 2013.](#)

³⁴⁵ ["Egyptian court acquits Mohammed Zawahiri and brother of Sadat's assassin", Al-Arabiya, 19 March 2012.](#)



[in Egypt](#).³⁴⁶ The shared ideology between both groups served a mutual purpose.

332. The release of Mohammed Zawahiri occurred just after the [prison escape of Ayman Nofel](#),³⁴⁷ a senior official in al-Qassam Brigades. After his escape, Nofel fled to Gaza where he reiterated his hope to see the Muslim Brotherhood in power and indicating that he would [“resume \[...\] work with the Qassam Brigades. We are preparing and training for the next battle. This is our right.”](#)³⁴⁸

333. The call to *jihad* also enlisted the support of the Islamic State who took credit for coordinated attacks committed by members of [Sinai Province against Egyptian military and police in the Sinai peninsula on 30 January 2015](#).³⁴⁹ A security expert has commented on the increased activity by Sinai Province in the Sinai region following Morsi’s removal as a means to [avenge the Muslim Brotherhood](#).³⁵⁰ Two days after the coordinated attack in Sinai, officials from the Muslim Brotherhood called for a [“long, uncompromising jihad in Egypt”](#).³⁵¹

³⁴⁶ [Kredo, A., “Foreigners, Diplomats Warned to Leave Egypt or be Targeted for Jihad”, Washington Free Beacon, 3 February 2015.](#)

³⁴⁷ [Sherwood, H., “Egyptian uprising enables jailed Hamas militant to escape”, The Guardian, 7 February 2011.](#)

³⁴⁸ [Sherwood, H., “Egyptian uprising enables jailed Hamas militant to escape”, The Guardian, 7 February 2011.](#)

³⁴⁹ [Kingsley, P. and Abdo, M., “At least 32 killed in Egypt as militants attack army and police targets in Sinai”, The Guardian, 30 January 2015.](#)

³⁵⁰ [Schachtel, J., “State Dept: Muslim Brotherhood Us Trip ‘Organized And Funded’ By Georgetown University”, Breitbart, 30 January 2015.](#)

³⁵¹ [Kredo, A., “Open Jihad Declared in Egypt Following State Dept. Meeting with Muslim Brotherhood-Aligned Leaders”, Washington Free Beacon, 30 January 2015.](#)



334. Tacit support for militant Islamist groups has also attracted support for it from al-Shabaab, with [leaders of the group calling on the Muslim Brotherhood to take up arms in Egypt](#).³⁵²

4.4.2 *Material support*

335. The Muslim Brotherhood is involved in both the direct and indirect provision of funds to militant Islamist groups.

336. This follows the declaration of a new strategy adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood to confront Western imperialism and former General Guide, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, specifically called upon the Muslim Brotherhood to grant [financial and material support](#) to join the ‘resistance’ against the U.S.-Israel alliance.³⁵³

337. In 1988, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood founded ‘Bank Al-Taqwa Limited’,³⁵⁴ appointing co-founder, Youssef Nada, as chairman of the bank. Egyptian-born Nada is a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, having [joined the group at a young age in 1948](#),³⁵⁵ and subsequently led the group’s ‘foreign affairs bureau’ for twenty-five years whilst based in Europe.

³⁵² [Khalif, A., “Take up arms now, Al-Shabaab urges Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood”, Africa Review, 20 August 2013.](#)

³⁵³ [Halevi, J., “Where is The Muslim Brotherhood Headed?”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 20 June 2012.](#)

³⁵⁴ Acharya, A., “Targeting Terrorist Financing: International Cooperation and New Regimes, Routledge (2012), page 60.

³⁵⁵ [Hope, B., “Muslim Brotherhood insider says revolution not the goal”, The National, 1 October 2012.](#)



338. Within ten years of its inception, al-Taqwa bank was the subject of an Italian investigation for an alleged transfer of \$60 million to al-Qassam Brigades and other militant Islamist groups.³⁵⁶ This was followed by a Swiss investigation of the bank's branch in Lugano, Switzerland and a Bahamian investigation where the bank was registered.³⁵⁷

339. The on-set of investigations into the bank led to the discovery of a list of al-Taqwa's shareholders which included Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood cleric, two relatives of Osama bin Laden and Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, one of al-Qa'ida's co-founders.³⁵⁸

340. It was during these investigations that the document, known as the "[Swiss Project](#)" was discovered by Swiss investigators.³⁵⁹ The document concerned a twelve-point strategy for the establishment of an Islamic *caliphate* and is widely accepted as having been drafted by associates of the Muslim Brotherhood.

341. As a result of these investigations, al-Taqwa bank, Youssef Nada and other affiliates of the bank were blacklisted by the U.S. in its

³⁵⁶ Napoleoni, L., "Terrorism and the Economy: How the War on Terror is Bankrupting the World", Seven Stories Press (2010), page 25.

³⁵⁷ Napoleoni, L., "Terrorism and the Economy: How the War on Terror is Bankrupting the World", Seven Stories Press (2010), page 25.

³⁵⁸ Napoleoni, L., "Terrorism and the Economy: How the War on Terror is Bankrupting the World", Seven Stories Press (2010), page 27.

³⁵⁹ [Poole, P., "The Muslim Brotherhood 'Project'", FrontPageMag, 11 May 2006.](#)



[Executive Order 13224](#).³⁶⁰ In correspondence to Swiss authorities, George Wolfe, U.S. Treasury Deputy Counsel, stated that the U.S. authorities possessed information which indicated that al-Taqwa had "[long been thought to be involved in financing radical groups](#)".³⁶¹ The [U.S. linked al-Taqwa to the provision of funds to al-Qa'ida](#) and other organisations officially designated by the U.S. as groups that sponsor terrorism.³⁶²

342. In accordance with [UNSC Resolutions 1267 \(1999\)](#)³⁶³ and [1333 \(2000\)](#),³⁶⁴ Nada was also placed on the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC") list of individuals allegedly linked to al-Qa'ida.

343. The UNSC found that Mr. Nada had participated "[in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of](#)" al-Qa'ida, further providing that:

"As of October 2000, Bank Al Taqwa Limited provided a clandestine line of credit to a close associate of Usama bin Laden. As of late September 2001, Youssef Nada provided

³⁶⁰ ["Office of Foreign Assets Control", U.S. Department of the Treasury, 23 September 2001.](#)

³⁶¹ [Hosenball, M., "Terror Watch: Probe Closed", News Week, 1 June 2005.](#)

³⁶² [Levitt, M., "Islamic Extremism in Europe: Beyond al-Qaeda – Hamas and Hezbollah in Europe", Washington Institute, 27 April 2005.](#)

³⁶³ [S/RES/1267 \(1999\), adopted by the Security Council at its 4051st meeting on 15 October 1999.](#)

³⁶⁴ [S/RES/1333 \(2000\), adopted by the Security Council at its 4251st meeting, on 19 December 2000.](#)



financial assistance to Usama bin Laden and the organisation of Al-Qaida.”³⁶⁵

344. Despite the lack of charges against Nada or al-Taqwa bank, it cannot be conclusively stated that al-Taqwa bank had no association with the provision of funds to militant Islamist groups. As stated by Mark Weidmer, spokesperson for the Swiss Attorney-General’s office in 2005: “[we don’t say that they \[Nada and al-Taqwa\] are innocent](#)”.³⁶⁶

345. During the trial proceedings,³⁶⁷ a number of documents tendered into evidence revealed the involvement of a number of high-ranking members of Muslim Brotherhood in the provision of funds to a designated foreign terrorist organisation. A number of these members were listed as [unindicted co-conspirators](#) including: Yusuf al-Qaradawi; Mousa Abu Marzook; Omar Ahmad; Abdurahman Alamoudi; Jamal Badawi; Mohammad Jaghli; and Abdel Aziz Rantisi.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁵ [Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 \(1999\) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities.](#)

³⁶⁶ [Hosenball, M., “Terror Watch: Probe Closed”, News Week, 1 June 2005.](#)

³⁶⁷ [Note that the first round of proceedings resulted in a mistrial.](#)

³⁶⁸ “Voices of Palestine: Abdel Aziz Rantisi”, FrontPageMag, 7 December 2011 available at <http://www.frontpagemag.com/2011/frontpagemag-com/voices-of-palestine-abdel-aziz-rantisi/2/>



346. The Muslim Brotherhood has been associated in criminal proceedings concerning the funding of other militant Islamist groups.³⁶⁹

347. These activities are also undertaken by individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Khairat Shater, a high-ranking member of the Muslim Brotherhood, has been linked to the provision of funds to a number of militant Islamist groups. In particular, [Shater is reported to have provided Ayman Zawahiri, leader of al-Qa'ida, \\$25 million](#) whilst Morsi was in government in order to secure al-Qa'ida's support for the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁷⁰

348. Khairat Shater has also reportedly [provided funding to Ansar Beit al-Maqdis](#) as a result of negotiations presided over by Mohammed Zawahiri.³⁷¹ Shater is reported to have funded militant Islamist groups in order to preserve the Muslim Brotherhood's position in government.

349. The Muslim Brotherhood has also been involved in the indirect financing of militant Islamist groups in Iraq and Syria using the [political and financial leverage of countries such as Qatar and Turkey to achieve its aims.](#)

³⁶⁹ [Ahmed, N., "Islamic State is the cancer of modern capitalism", Middle East Eye, 27 March 2015.](#)

³⁷⁰ ["Former Egyptian Jihad Leader: Morsi Gave \\$25M to Al Qaeda", Clarion Project, 25 April 2014.](#)

³⁷¹ [Farid, S., "Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis: Egypt's own al-Qaeda?", Al-Arabiya, 1 February 2014.](#)



350. Qatar and Turkey have been sources of support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Both states have hosted Muslim Brotherhood members for decades, for example, [Yusuf al-Qaradawi has been exiled in Qatar for over six decades](#).³⁷²

351. Although senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood had to leave Qatar in 2014, they were not expelled from the state. At the time, Qatar was under regional pressure to disassociate itself from the Muslim Brotherhood following a [Gulf Cooperation Council agreement signed in Riyadh in 2013](#).³⁷³ The senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood therefore opted to leave Qatar so as to “[avoid embarrassing Qatar](#)”³⁷⁴ and sought safe haven from which they could “[run \[their\] activities free of pressure](#)”.³⁷⁵ Upon leaving Qatar, the members were [immediately welcomed by Turkey](#).³⁷⁶

352. Qatar and Turkey have calibrated support for affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood to the extent in which each state perceives it as a strategic asset. For Qatar, this is the achievement of [gaining political](#)

³⁷² [Kirkpatrick, D., “After Long Exile, Sunni Cleric Takes Role in Egypt”, New York Times, 18 February 2011.](#)

³⁷³ [Hussein, W., “Egypt cautiously accepts reconciliation with Qatar”, Al-Monitor, 8 December 2014.](#)

³⁷⁴ [“Qatar expels Egypt's exiled Muslim Brotherhood leaders”, DW, 13 September 2014.](#)

³⁷⁵ [“Three Muslim Brotherhood leaders arrive in Turkey after leaving Qatar”, Today's Zaman, 19 September 2014.](#)

³⁷⁶ [“Three Muslim Brotherhood leaders arrive in Turkey after leaving Qatar”, Today's Zaman, 19 September 2014.](#)



[dominance in the region](#)³⁷⁷ thereby overtaking Saudi Arabia; whilst Turkey seeks [to return as the seat of the pan-Islamic caliphate](#).³⁷⁸

4.5 Repercussions for The Muslim Brotherhood

353. The Muslim Brotherhood's involvement in supporting and sponsoring violent acts of terrorism has resulted in severe consequences for the group. The Muslim Brotherhood has been banned in [Syria \(1964\)](#) and Iraq (1954).³⁷⁹ [Russia followed suit and banned the Muslim Brotherhood in 2003](#).³⁸⁰ More recently, it has been banned in [Egypt](#),³⁸¹ [Saudi Arabia](#)³⁸² and the [United Arab Emirates](#).³⁸³ Of note is Saudi Arabia's decision [to ban the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic State at the same time](#).³⁸⁴ All designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation.

354. Individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood have also been sanctioned for their involvement in assisting militant Islamist groups. For example, Yusuf al-Qaradawi has been banned from entering the

³⁷⁷ [Smolczyk, A and Zand, B., "Power Play in the Gulf: Tiny Qatar Has Big Diplomatic Ambitions", Der Spiegel, 14 March 2012.](#)

³⁷⁸ Puder, J., "The Widening Turkey-Saudi Arabia Rift", FrontpageMag, 7 November 2013 available at <http://www.frontpagemag.com/2013/joseph-puder/the-widening-turkey-saudi-arabia-rift/>

³⁷⁹ Rabasa, A., "The Muslim World After 9/11", RAND Corporation (2004), page 122.

³⁸⁰ [Mourad, M., "What next for Egypt and Russia?", Ahram Online, 23 April 2013.](#)

³⁸¹ ["Egypt court bans Muslim Brotherhood's political wing", BBC News, 9 August 2014.](#)

³⁸² ["Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood 'terrorist group'", BBC News, 7 March 2014.](#)

³⁸³ ["UAE lists Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist group", Reuters, 15 November 2014.](#)

³⁸⁴ ["Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood 'terrorist group'", BBC News, 7 March 2014.](#)



[U.S \(1999\)](#);³⁸⁵ the [U.K. \(2008\)](#);³⁸⁶ [Ireland \(2011\)](#)³⁸⁷ and more recently, [France \(2012\)](#).³⁸⁸ [Saudi Arabia has banned Mufti Muhammad Al-Arifi](#) from travelling to Qatar due to his support of the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁸⁹ A travel ban has also been imposed on [Mohammed Morsi; Mohammed Badie and Khairat Shater](#) by Egyptian authorities in 2013.³⁹⁰

355. The Egyptian authorities have further frozen the assets of a number of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including, *inter alia*, [Mohamed Badie, Rashad Bayoumi and Khairat Shater](#).³⁹¹ Muslim Brotherhood members, [Youssef Nada](#),³⁹² [Abdulrahman al-Amoudi](#)³⁹³ and [Yasin al-Qadi](#)³⁹⁴ have all been subject to various asset freezing orders in light of their alleged financing of terrorist groups.

4.6 Concluding remarks

³⁸⁵ [Eden, R., "Tories investigate their own Muslim website", The Telegraph, 14 November 2009.](#)

³⁸⁶ [Dodd, V., "Controversial Muslim cleric banned from Britain", The Guardian, 7 February 2008.](#)

³⁸⁷ [Phelan, S., "'Fatwa' sheikh with links to Irish Muslims is refused visa", Independent IE, 8 August 2011.](#)

³⁸⁸ ["French visa ban blow to Al Qaradawi", Gulf News, 27 March 2012.](#)

³⁸⁹ ["S Arabia imposes travel ban on Al-Arifi", Press TV, 20 July 2013.](#)

³⁹⁰ ["Egypt security slaps travel ban on Morsi, top Islamists: AFP", Ahram Online, 3 July 2013.](#)

³⁹¹ El-Dabh, B., "Court freezes assets of Islamist leaders", Daily News Egypt, 17 September 2013 available at <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/17/court-freezes-assets-of-islamist-leaders/>

³⁹² [The Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee, Annual Statement of Information for the year 2010 on Updates to the Consolidated List.](#)

³⁹³ [Emerson, S., "Stop Aid and Comfort For Patrons of Terror", Wall Street Journal, 5 August 1996.](#)

³⁹⁴ ["U.S. Interagency Efforts To Combat Terrorist Financing", US State Dept., 15 December 2003.](#)



356. When assessing militant Islamist groups, there is a danger of focusing on each group in isolation and highlighting the differences between each group. In reality, the groups are not rigidly demarcated but share common origins, ideological values and material and financial support. At the core of these militant Islamist groups, is the Muslim Brotherhood.

357. Since its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has provided theological justification for violent acts of terrorism committed by militant Islamist groups. As commented by Saudi journalist [Mshari Al-Zaydi](#):

“Without people like Sayyid Qutb and Hassan Al-Banna, and books like *Milestones*, and *The Messages of Da’wa*, or concepts like *Al-Hakimiyyah* (divine rule) and *Ustaziatul Alam* (mastership of the world,) there would have been no Islamist terrorism today. There would be no terrorist chiefs like Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi or Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. There would be no Khalid Islambouli, who assassinated President Sadat. There would be no jihadist ideologues like Abdullah Azzam, Abdul Majeed Al-Zindani.”³⁹⁵

358. Rather than disconnect itself from the positions adopted by al-Banna and Qutb, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to reach out to those who share and value the same ideology, these being the same

³⁹⁵ Al-Zaydi, M., “Opinion: The Muslim Brotherhood will never change”, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 15 February 2015.



groups and individuals which perpetually shock the world with violent acts committed for the purpose of establishing a pan-Islamic *caliphate*.



CHAPTER 5

Review Of Political Activities In Egypt

1970-2010



5.1 1970s-80s: Regrouping and rebuilding

359. Following the Nasser government crackdown in the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood spent much of the next three decades rebuilding an organisation that had been dramatically depleted. Moreover, internal ideological rifts between the old guard and some of the next generation had thrown the movement into disarray.

360. Under the leadership of Umar al-Tilmisani, the Muslim Brotherhood's effort to rebrand itself publicly as a moderate group that renounced violence prompted fierce criticism from many of its own members and supporters, both within and outside Egypt.

361. Prominent al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri (a former member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood discussed in Chapter 4 above), [described](#)³⁹⁶ the Muslim Brotherhood leadership's public denunciation of acts of violence and terrorist activity committed by members or affiliated Islamist groups "contrary to God's sovereignty" and a "betrayal."

362. Al-Qassam Brigades also [condemned](#)³⁹⁷ the decision made by its parent organisation, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, to renounce violence, maintaining that violent jihad is a justified means to fulfil the

³⁹⁶ ["Muslim Brotherhood", American Foreign Policy Council.](#)

³⁹⁷ ["Muslim Brotherhood", American Foreign Policy Council.](#)



global movement's ambition of "ridding Islamic lands of infidels" in pursuit of establishing a global Islamic state.

363. The Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Syria also [criticized](#)³⁹⁸ the change in direction of its Egyptian counterpart. The Syrian group openly supported attacks against Israel and the U.S. in Iraq and voiced full support for the Iranian-backed Shi'ite militia Hezbollah – a designated terrorist group in Western countries.

364. After al-Tilmisani's death in 1986, Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr was elected as General Guide (purportedly due to the significant influence among the leadership core of Mustafa Mashhour, who was to succeed al-Nasr as General Guide in 1996).

365. Al-Tilmisani's death put an end to the beginning of any shift in ideology away from violent jihad, and the Muslim Brotherhood reverted to its core ideological tenets that al-Banna had laid out in the 1940s. This remains the group's position today.

³⁹⁸ ["Muslim Brotherhood", American Foreign Policy Council.](#)



5.2 1990s – 2011: Emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a political force in Egypt

5.2.1 *Success in 1980s elections*

366. Parliamentary elections, though largely closed to opposition, give some indication of the Muslim Brotherhood's popularity under President Hosni Mubarak. In elections in 1984 and 1987, the party aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood received more votes than all the other opposition parties combined.

367. With the succession of [Mustafa Mashhour³⁹⁹](#) (a former Secret Apparatus leader) as General Guide in 1996, the militant ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood once again came to the fore. The strategy was to gradually gain political support by taking advantage of political and social developments to increase its membership and influence.

5.2.2 *Social impact*

368. During the 1990s the Muslim Brotherhood, whilst still officially outlawed, reorganized itself to engage with all levels and classes of Egyptian society to gain support and bolster its ranks. During this period it published two newspapers, "*Liwa' al-islam*", translated as "The Banner of Islam", and "*Al-I'tisam*", or "Adherence". These

³⁹⁹ [Deeb, M., "Egypt in 1996", Encyclopaedia Britannica.](#)



publications maintained regional and national offices, made public statements and sold books written by prominent members.

369. The Muslim Brotherhood was careful to present a moderate and reformist public façade by setting up charities, schools and hospitals, pursuing al-Banna and Qutb's long-term, gradualist approach to the establishment of an Islamic state. This would be obtained by popular consent which would be attracted by social and economic reforms.

370. The economic downturn in Egypt also provided fertile ground for the Muslim Brotherhood to present itself as an attractive political alternative among many who were becoming increasingly disenchanted with what they perceived as a corrupt government. As a result, Islamic charities and private mosques flourished.

371. It was in this scattered network of different Muslim Brotherhood-supported associations where hearts and minds would start to be turned against the government in support of the movement's Islamic ideology.⁴⁰⁰ Members of Egypt's leading professional associations were economically disadvantaged university graduates whose votes helped Muslim Brotherhood candidates gain large majorities on the executive boards of several of these associations, such as those representing lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, scientists and engineers.

⁴⁰⁰ Wickham, C. R., "Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change in Egypt" New York: Columbia University Press (2002), pages 66, 71-75, 88-118, 128-138.



372. At the same time, the wheels of the international Muslim Brotherhood network were spinning. Muslim Brotherhood branches and related organisations gained prominent positions in Europe's sociopolitical scene, presenting themselves as moderates and the legitimate representatives of Muslim communities in Europe.

373. In 2000, the Muslim Brotherhood ran 76 parliamentary candidates as independents and won 17 seats, as many as all the other opposition parties combined.

5.3 Muslim Brotherhood becomes main political opposition group in Egypt

374. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood's candidates, who stood as independents, [won 88 seats](#),⁴⁰¹ which was 20% of the total. It was able to form the largest opposition bloc and cement its role as Egypt's dominant opposition force.

375. The Mubarak government feared a rise in Islamic extremism as a result of the Muslim Brotherhood's increased political influence and subsequently instituted a number of legal "reforms" to counter its resurgence including a change to the constitution which was [rewritten](#)⁴⁰² to stipulate that "political activity or political parties shall not be based on any religious background or foundation."

⁴⁰¹ ["Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood", BBC News website, 25 December 2013.](#)

⁴⁰² ["Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood", BBC News website, 25 December 2013.](#)



376. In 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood distributed a [draft program](#)⁴⁰³ for its proposed political party which called for the introduction of Islamic rule, the rejection of the civil nature of the state and the exclusion of non-Muslim minorities and women from domestic politics. It also called for a special council of Islamic clerics to vet parliamentary legislation. During the 2008-9 Gaza War, some Muslim Brotherhood leaders called for jihad and encouraged Egyptians to go to Gaza and fight Israel, notwithstanding Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel.

377. Its rise in power coincided with bolder statements of intent as regards the Muslim Brotherhood's political and social philosophy. The group's motto sums it up neatly - "Islam is the Solution".

⁴⁰³ [Trofimov, Y., "Muslim Brotherhood Falters as Egypt Outflanks Islamists", The Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2009.](#)



CHAPTER 6

Current Status of the Muslim Brotherhood

In Egypt



6.1 Public Opposition to Morsi Government

378. Within a short period after he came to power in June 2012, serious public opposition developed against President Mohamed Morsi. There were a number of reasons for this, which will be discussed in more depth in a separately commissioned Report and is therefore only mentioned briefly below.

379. In late November 2012, Morsi [granted himself powers to legislate without judicial oversight or review of his acts](#),⁴⁰⁴ effectively placing himself above oversight of any kind, including by the courts. He also placed a draft constitution to a referendum that led to wide-scale protests that his government was attempting to impose upon the country the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamist agenda. This triggered [mass protests](#)⁴⁰⁵ against the Morsi government and against the Muslim Brotherhood. Prominent Cairo-based author Yasmine El Rashidi reported in her article, published during the final months of the Morsi government, entitled "[Egypt: The Rule of the Brotherhood](#)",

"In the press you could read that the Brotherhood was engaged in one "power grab" after another—of the parliament, the cabinet, the press itself. And beginning last spring, there was another power grab during the drafting of the constitution for the new, democratic Egypt. What was meant to be a

⁴⁰⁴ [Hendawi, H., "Egyptian courts suspend work to protest Morsi decrees", Associated Press, 28 November 2012.](#)

⁴⁰⁵ ["Egyptians take anti-Morsi protests to presidential palace", The Independent, 5 December 2012.](#)



“representative” one-hundred-member Constitutional Assembly had been turned, by the Islamist-led parliament, into an Islamist-dominated one, and one in which the Islamists—the Muslim Brotherhood members but also ultra-orthodox Salafis—were trying, increasingly, to impose their own rigid, radical views.”⁴⁰⁶

380. Following the 2013 revolution, the new government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation and arrested and imprisoned many of its senior members and confiscated its assets. The government’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood generally (not only members of the former Morsi-led government) was [supported](#)⁴⁰⁷ by a significant portion of the country’s population who believed that the Muslim Brotherhood, which many perceived as the real power behind the Morsi-government, was “destroying Egypt” through its aggressive advancement of Islamic policies.

381. Mshari Al-Zaydi, a Saudi journalist and expert on Islamic movements and Islamic fundamentalism, [stated](#)⁴⁰⁸ immediately following the 2013 revolution,

⁴⁰⁶ [El Rashidi, Y., “Egypt: The Rule of the Brotherhood”, The New York Review of Books, 7 February 2013.](#)

⁴⁰⁷ [Lynch, S., “Muslim Brotherhood down, not out, in Egypt”, USA Today, 26 September 2013.](#)

⁴⁰⁸ [Al-Zaydi, M., “Opinion: The return of the Muslim Brotherhood’s “secret apparatus?”, Asharq Al-Awsat, 6 July 2013.](#)



“[T]he Muslim Brotherhood has been exposed, uncovering their true puritanical face which they had previously managed to hide behind false smiles and shaky claims about democracy, dialogue, tolerance, etc.”

382. He [warns](#)⁴⁰⁹ however that it would be wrong (and dangerous) to suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood has ceased to be influential and that there is a fear that the movement may reactivate its military wing, the Secret Apparatus (discussed above) out of vengeance amidst statements from senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Mohamed al-Beltagy (supported by similar statements from leaders of other Islamic groups, including U.S. and E.U.-designated terrorist groups such Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya), stating that they would defend Morsi's legitimacy (as president) “with their blood”.

383. The cause of the 2013 revolution, and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters in the violent aftermath that followed, will be reviewed in subsequent Reports to be released later in 2015.

9 Bedford Row

London

2 April 2015

⁴⁰⁹ [Al-Zaydi, M., “Opinion: The return of the Muslim Brotherhood’s “secret apparatus?”](#), [Asharq Al-Awsat](#), 6 July 2013.



GLOSSARY



Glossary of Arabic Terms

Transliterated Arabic Term	English Meaning
<i>Bay'a</i>	"Pledge"; an oath of allegiance to a leader (Caliph or Iman).
<i>Dar-al-Harb</i>	"Abode of War"
<i>Dar-al-Islam</i>	"Abode of Peace"
<i>Al-dawa'ir</i>	"District" offices
<i>Da'wah</i>	"The call to Islam"; proselytizing.
<i>Dhimma</i>	"Protected Persons"; usually referring to Jews and Christians living in an Islamic state who must pay a special tax (<i>jizya</i>)
<i>Fitnah</i>	"Discord", "trial" or "tribulation"
<i>Intifadah</i>	"Shaking off"; refers to Palestinian uprisings against the Israeli Occupation.
<i>Jahiliyya</i>	Age of ignorance before Islam arrived in Arabia.
<i>Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin</i>	"The Society of Muslim Brothers"; the official name of the Muslim brotherhood.
<i>Jizya</i>	A tax to be paid by non-Muslim males living under Muslim political control.
<i>Jihad</i>	"Struggle"; earnest striving (or fighting) in the way of God
<i>Jund</i>	Soldiers
<i>Kafir (kuffar)</i>	Disbeliever(s)



<i>Karama</i>	Dignity
<i>Khawaja</i>	“Master” or “Lord”; title of respect
<i>Majlis al-Shura</i>	“Consultative Council”
<i>Maktab al-Khidimat</i>	“Bureau of Services”
<i>Manatiq</i>	“Areas”
<i>Manhaj</i>	Methodology by which truth is established.
<i>Manzila</i>	Status
<i>Al-Murshid al-amm</i>	General Guide
<i>Al-Nadhir</i>	“The Magazine”
<i>Nizam al-khass</i>	“Special Section”; the ‘Secret Apparatus’ of the Muslim Brotherhood.
<i>Al-Qawl wa al-Fasl</i>	“Words and Separating Good from Evil”
<i>Al-Qa’ida</i>	“The basis”
<i>Salafiyya</i>	“The following of the (righteous) predecessor/ancestors”; Used to refer to those imitating the first three generations of Muslims.
<i>Al-Shabaab</i>	“The Youth”
<i>Islamic sharia</i>	“The path to the watering hole”; Islamic canonical law based on the teachings of the <i>Qur’an</i> and <i>Sunnah</i> .
<i>Shahadah</i>	“Declaration” or “Witness”: testimony of faith (one of the five pillars of Islam).
<i>Shura</i>	“Consultation”; terms used for consultative



	bodies throughout the Islamic and Arab world.
<i>Sufi</i>	Muslim Mystic
<i>Sunnah</i>	“The path” or “example”; refers to actions or sayings from the life of Prophet Mohammed.
<i>Sunni</i>	Largest denomination of Islam, term derived from <i>Sunnah</i> .
<i>Takfir</i>	Declaration of individual or group (of previously considered Muslims) as disbelievers.
<i>Tanzim al Dawli</i>	“The international organisation”
<i>Watan</i>	“Home” or “Nation”